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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY IN
MORALITY AND LAW
Larry D. Barnett*
“When they discover the center of the universe,
a lot of people will be disappointed to discover
they are not it.” Bernard Bailey1
OVERVIEW
The article advances the thesis that the doctrines and
concepts of law are attributable to the properties of society and
to the forces molding these properties. The thesis, after being
illustrated with the federal Investment Advisers Act, is assessed
quantitatively using data from a survey of a national sample of
adults in U.S. households. The survey, which was conducted in
1991, ascertained whether interviewees classified morality as a
private matter or as a public issue. The public or private nature

* Professor, School of Law, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware
19803-0474 USA. Email address: ldbarnett@widener.edu.
The preparation of this article benefitted from the resources and
excellent staff of the Widener University Legal Information Center in
Wilmington, Delaware. For their assistance, I would like to thank the
following members of the Center staff: David King, Enza Klotzbucher, Mary
Jane Mallonee, and Kelly Pierce.
Parts III and IV of this article were presented in July 2009 in Oñati,
Spain at the annual meeting of the Research Committee on the Sociology of
Law. They were also presented in September 2009 in Wilmington, Delaware
at the Widener University School of Law. Questions and comments from
persons attending these presentations were helpful to me in clarifying Parts
III and IV. I am, of course, solely responsible for any errors that remain.
1
Michael Moncur’s Cynical Quotations, The Quotations Page, http://
www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Bernard_Bailey *last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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of morality in social values was the dependent variable in a
study that assumed (i) law does not attempt to regulate an
activity, or explicitly protects the activity from regulation, when
society designates the activity as private, and (ii) the doctrines of
law designed to regulate activities that are designated public
embody the doctrines of prevailing morality.
Because social values on whether morality is private or
public comprised the dependent variable, the factors that mold
these values have the potential to prevent or permit law designed
to regulate socially significant activities. Logistic regression was
used to estimate the relationship to the dependent variable of two
sets of factors that may influence whether morality is designated
private or public. One set was factors that structure (e.g.,
stratify) a society and that have important societal correlates and
consequences. The other set was comprised of modes of thought
and conduct that are cultural dimensions of a society. Notable
relationships to the dependent variable were found for the
structural factors of gender and, among women, educational
attainment. In terms of gender, the odds that morality would be
considered a private matter were approximately three-and-a-half
times higher among women than among men. In terms of
education, the odds that morality would be considered private
were approximately three-fourths lower among women with
thirteen or more years of schooling than among women with
twelve or fewer years of schooling. The article suggests that,
because the odds of placing morality in the private sphere are
appreciably greater among women, gains in the status of women
may help to explain U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
construed the Constitution to restrict government regulation of
sexual activity and its incidents.
I. THE RULE AND ROLE OF LAW IN SOCIETY

A. The Rule of Law
The concept underlying the phrase “the rule of law” conveys
a specific image both of the nature of law and of the role of law
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in society. The concept is pertinent to the instant article because
it is embedded in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence2 and is generally
believed to be a key to the success of modern societies.3 In the
United States, the concept enjoys widespread support,4 and if
this support accurately gauges the prevalence of the concept and
of the image of law linked to the concept, a large fraction of
Americans believe law to be a significant aspect of their
country. Not surprisingly, persons in law-related occupations
share that belief, and they may assign even greater importance
than the public to “the rule of law.” In their view, both the
structure and operation of U.S. society depend on law.5 Thus,
the concept of “the rule of law” has been employed to suggest
that the existence6 and equilibrium7 of a society are impossible
without law. According to this view, “we have survived and
prospered as a free nation because we have adhered to the rule
of law.”8
What, however, is “the rule of law”? When does “the rule
of law” exist? A concept, to be useful, must have an identifiable
2

Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The
Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing
Principles of Political Economy, 69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 753 (2001)
(referring to “the rule of law” as “the bedrock of western law”).
3
See, e.g., Martin Krygier & Whit Mason, Violence, Development and
the Rule of Law 2 (Univ. of N.S.W., Research Paper No. 2008-8, 2008)
(“The rule of law is so popular these days that there is little it is not called
upon to do or to fix.”).
4
James L. Gibson, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 603–05 (2007).
5
Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194,
1223 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J, concurring) (contending that the rule of law
and the protections it affords are necessary for a capitalist economy and
personal safety).
6
See Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. SST Concorde Alert
Program, 394 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (“History proves that our
society can survive only by law or else be consumed and destroyed by
man . . . .”).
7
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part) (“The rule of law is important in the stability of society.”).
8
Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1272 (Fla. 2000) (Harding, J.,
dissenting).
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referent, but the concept of “the rule of law” has no generally
accepted referent or set of referents.9 Nonetheless, “the rule of
law” would seem to be associated with the presence of at least
four conditions:10 (i) the law of the society has unambiguous
standards; (ii) the standards are the same for, and are applied in
the same way to, all members of a category of human beings or
entities; (iii) the categories that are used by law to differentiate
human beings and entities, and the standards of each category,
are accepted by the society; and (iv) the standards for a given
category are manifested in the behavior and activities of the
members of the category. The preceding list of attributes of “the
rule of law” is consistent with conclusions regarding law that
courts and scholars have reached—that law must be fair11 in
content,12 appearance,13 and application.14 However, despite its

9

See Marc O. DeGirolami, Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 573, 576 (2008) (explaining the difficulty in defining the rule of law).
10
The elements of the rule of law that have been enumerated in “leading
modern accounts” of the concept are summarized in Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 8–9 (1997). Professor Fallon indicates that the concept of “the rule
of law” is an ideal but points out that agreement has not been reached on the
elements of the ideal. Id. at 10, 55.
11
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)
(noting that the enforcement of law is unconstitutional when it fails to
“comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency”); see also People
ex. rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1985) (noting
that law cannot be useful “[W]ithout a belief by the people that the system [of
law] is just and impartial”).
12
See David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional
Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2621, 2640 (2006) (“[L]aws on the books play
an essential role in the fair and just exercise of legal force.”).
13
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (pointing out the
importance that “legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them”);
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (remarking that the
judiciary must provide “the appearance and reality of fairness” in order to
“‘generat[e] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice
has been done’”).
14
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (observing that law in
the United States demands equality in its development and execution).
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importance to maintaining cohesion in a society,15 fairness does
not seem to be the primary focus of the concept of “the rule of
law.” Instead, the concept by its very name highlights the idea
of rule. With this emphasis, the concept of “the rule of law”
suggests that the law of a society controls,16 and thus is followed
by, the individuals and entities in the society.17 Indeed, the
concept means literally that, in a society characterized by the
rule of law, there is obedience to law.18 Law, in a word,
regulates.
B. Law as a Regulator
In the United States, then, law is believed to be at the heart
of society, and the belief seems to rest heavily on the
assumption that, in a society whose structure is complex and
whose population is large and diverse, law is a highly effective
means of guiding the behavior of individuals and the activities of
groups. But is law successful when it seeks to regulate, i.e.,
control, important aspects of social life? An explicit or implicit
intent to regulate, directly or indirectly, is embedded in law as
an institution19—to the degree that a society deems behavior X to
15

See Joel Brockner et al., The Influence on Prior Commitment to an
Institution on Reactions to Perceived Unfairness: The Higher They Are, the
Harder They Fall, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 241 (1992).
16
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420
(1983) (referring to the United States as “a society governed by the rule of
law” (emphasis added)). The word “rule” is defined to include “[a] principle,
regulation, or maxim governing individual conduct.” 14 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 228 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). The word “govern” has
among its definitions “to direct and control the actions and affairs of (a
people, a state or its members).” 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 709 (2d
ed. 1989).
17
ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY 259–60 (1995); see Gibson,
supra note 4, at 597 (“[T]he essential ingredient of the rule of law is
universalism—the law should be universally heeded.” (emphasis omitted)).
18
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213 (1979).
19
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 75 (1919); Elie Mischel, Note, “Thou
Shalt Not Go About as a Talebearer Among Thy People”: Jewish Law and the
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be desirable and public in nature, the law of the society will
seek to increase the frequency of X, and to the extent that a
society deems behavior Y to be undesirable and public, the law
of the society will be designed to eliminate (or at least reduce)
the occurrence of Y. However, if law does not fulfill its
regulatory goal, i.e., if law does not appreciably affect the
behaviors and activities it targets, the contention that law is
critical to a society must either be abandoned or, if retained,
justified on other grounds.
Unfortunately for the advocates of the contention that law is
an effective regulatory mechanism, a substantial body of welldesigned quantitative research has found that law does not
appreciably and permanently alter social patterns. Briefly stated,
the research indicates that the impact on targeted social behavior
of law-based regulation is generally just minimal in the long
term, and if and when the impact is substantial, it is shortlived.20 Moreover, regulation can have effects that are unwanted
by or harmful to society.21 Accordingly, the center of the
Private Facts Tort, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 811, 821 (2006).
20
Notable studies are cited and summarized in Larry D. Barnett, Law as
Symbol: Appearances in the Regulation of Investment Advisers and Attorneys,
55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 289, 300–01 nn.65–67 (2007) [hereinafter Law as
Symbol] and in Larry D. Barnett, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Boards of
Directors: Financial Protection or Social Productivity?, 16 J.L. & POL’Y
489, 528–29 nn.163–66, 530 n.168 (2008) [hereinafter Regulation of Mutual
Fund Boards of Directors]. Further supporting evidence, in conjunction with
an exceptional discussion of the research design needed to assess accurately
the impact of law, can be found in Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of
the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time
Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 361
(1996).
21
See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal
Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2001) (finding a
substantial rise in homicides from the enactment of state statutes that require
individuals, upon a third conviction for a violent crime, to be sentenced to a
lengthy prison term without possibility of parole); David Neumark & Wendy
A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Sex and Race Discrimination Laws, 44
ECON. INQUIRY 385, 411 (2006) (finding that the earnings of employed white
women and of employed black women are reduced in the short term, though
raised in the long term, by state statutes banning sex-based differentials in
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universe is unlikely to be either law as a set of ideas or the
individuals who write and apply the doctrines of law. If the
universe has a sociological center, it is evidently not a particular
institution but society itself.22
C. Law in a Macrosociological Framework
The thesis of the present article is that the concepts and
doctrines of law are macrosociological phenomena. Law is thus
treated in the article as a component of a larger social system,
i.e., of a society. In this framework, law as a societal
component is deemed to be an institution—i.e., a pattern of
human interaction that is common in, and a contributor to the
functioning of, the society in which it exists.23 The concepts and
doctrines of the institution of law are assumed by the framework
to result from the properties of society and the forces that mold
these properties. In the United States, however, such a
framework contradicts conventional thinking because the
framework considers individual human beings, including those
who are prominent in politics and those who are charismatic, to
have no long-term impact on the core content of law in a
democracy.24 Although my framework recognizes that an
individual can trigger a lasting change in the doctrines of law in
a democracy, it contends that an individual can do so only when
pay and that employment in these groups is reduced by such statutes in the
short term).
22
See Larry D. Barnett, Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, and the PublicPrivate Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework for Law 38–39
(Interuniversity Ctr. for Research on the Sociology of Law, Info. and Legal
Insts., Working Paper No. 34, 2008), available at http://www.cirsdig.it/
Pubblicazioni/barnett.pdf [hereinafter Public-Private Dichotomy in a
Macrosociological Framework].
23
Sociologically, an institution is a set of statuses and roles (i) that a
society defines and endorses and (ii) that involve interpersonal relationships
through which a socially approved type of activity takes place in the society.
Howard B. Kaplan, The Concept of Institution: A Review, Evaluation, and
Suggested Research Procedure, 39 SOC. FORCES 176, 179 (1960).
24
Individualism is a dominant theme in the culture and law of the United
States. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
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society-level properties and forces create the trigger. A
particular individual who triggers such a change is not essential
to the change, however, because other individuals could and
would also have done so. In my macrosociological framework,
then, explanations of non-ephemeral change in the central ideas
of law in a democracy are wrong when they attribute the change
to specific individuals, because the process that shapes these
ideas involves fungible individuals.
While quantitative research bearing on this framework is in
its infancy, the findings of currently available studies are
consistent with it. What does existing research suggest are the
most important societal properties that produce concepts and
doctrines of law? 25 In answering the question, I will also touch
on the key societal forces that seem to be responsible for
changing the societal properties pertinent to law. The discussion
of the properties and forces will inform the analyses undertaken
in subsequent parts of the instant article.
One property that evidently affects the law of a society is the
educational attainment of the members of the society. The
importance of education may arise from the relationship that
exists between educational level and rationality. Specifically,
education is at least a concomitant, and is probably a cause, of
the extent of rationality in a society. As a societal property,
educational attainment is likely to result from one large-scale
force in particular—the quantity and quality of knowledge that is
being used by a society.26
A second property that apparently has a bearing on the
content of law in a society is the degree of urbanization in the
society or, more precisely, the proportion of the inhabitants of
the society who are exposed to high population density.
Rationality is heightened among individuals who live and/or
work in large cities, theory suggests, because these individuals
25

The most persuasive of these studies are reviewed in Public-Private
Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13. That
review is the basis for the discussion which follows in the text.
26
Id. at 25–26; Larry D. Barnett, The Roots of Law, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 613, 630–32, 677–79 (2007) [hereinafter The
Roots of Law].
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are exposed to a wide range of changing stimuli.27 The density
of population in a society, of course, results from the rates of
fertility and mortality in the society, from the pace and patterns
of migration within the society, and from the rates of
immigration into and emigration out of the society.
A third property that may shape the content of law in a
society is the extent and severity of social, cultural, and
economic divisions within the population of the society. The
law of a society results from conditions that have an impact on
the society, and a plausible argument can be made that law can
be affected by social, cultural, and economic fractures in the
population of the society, e.g., by cleavages on the basis of
race,28 national origin, and/or income. For example, as the
population of a society becomes more heterogeneous in terms of
national origin, the law of the society is more likely to
incorporate doctrines that are symbols29 in order to counteract
the reduction in social cohesion caused by the heterogeneity.30
A further aspect of divisions within a society merits a brief
discussion here. Given a split in a society, law can be
formulated to pursue one of two objectives. First, law may
accept the continuation of the division but concern itself with
curbing unwanted activities (e.g., crime) to which the division is
believed to be a contributor.31 Second, law may be concerned
with erasing the division, as in the case of statutes banning
discrimination in employment. Unfortunately, the societal
conditions producing law that has the former concern rather than
27

GEORG SIMMEL, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in THE SOCIOLOGY
GEORG SIMMEL 409, 409–10 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., Free Press
1950).
28
See Joe Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death
Penalty?, 65 J. POL. 397, 415–16 (2003) (finding with cross-sectional data
that, among Caucasians, approval of the death penalty for individuals
convicted of murder varies with, inter alia, prejudice toward blacks).
29
Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at 315, 324, 328–29.
30
Hilde Coffé & Benny Geys, Community Heterogeneity: A Burden for
the Creation of Social Capital?, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1053, 1065, 1068 (2006).
31
David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the
Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 109,
111 (2002).
OF
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the latter concern have yet to be identified,32 but the existence of
one concern rather than the other may depend, inter alia, on the
degree to which the division creates friction between the
different sides of the division. Whatever the reason, the
doctrines of law do not occur by accident; rather, they are
adopted in response to, and are designed to improve, the
conditions of social life.
However, if law exists to benefit society, the question is why
law acts in the interests of society. What explains the
subservience of law to the society in which the law exists? In
my framework, a society is a system, and a system, by
definition, is organized.33 Being organized, a system is more
than the simple combination of its components, and a society,
therefore, is a discrete entity with distinct properties of its own.
Alternatively expressed, a society is comprised of structured
networks of interaction between members of a population, and

32

One study has found that certain indicators of state-level social and
economic divisions predict whether states have statutes that authorize the
death penalty. Id. at 121–22. However, the study did not include a control
for, and thus did not remove, state differences in knowledge use and, hence,
in rationality. Id. For example, differences between states in the educational
attainment and occupational composition of their inhabitants were not
controlled by the study with data on, respectively, the percentage of state
inhabitants that had completed four (or more) years of college and the
percentage of state inhabitants employed in white-collar occupations. Id.
Differences between education levels as well as differences between
occupations result from differences in quantity and quality of knowledge. The
Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 630–31, 678. Support for the death penalty is
affected by educational level. Soss et al., supra note 28, at 408, 415; Steven
F. Messner et al., Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and
Support for Capital Punishment, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 559, 576 (2006).
Support for the death penalty probably varies by occupation, too, because
occupations differ in the amount and type of knowledge required for their
duties. Thus, state differences in knowledge use could account for the
relationship between social and economic divisions in states, on the one hand,
and the existence of state death-penalty statutes, on the other.
33
A system is “[a] set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or
interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in
orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan . . . .” 17 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 (2d ed. 1989).
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both the network structure and the population possess properties
that their members do not have.34
If a system comprised of institutions—i.e., a society—has an
existence that is independent of its components (institutions), as
a macrosociological framework contends, the system will tend to
persist. A society, being a system, will normally be supported
by its institutions, according to the framework, and it will
therefore generally be characterized by inertia and by a
propensity for self-preservation. This reasoning, if correct,
permits the question posed in the prior paragraph to be answered
tentatively—a society develops and utilizes particular concepts
and doctrines of law because it is, and the concepts and
doctrines of law help to make it, a self-sustaining entity.
A related, and important, macrosociological proposition is
that, being a system composed of institutions, a society is
independent of the individual human beings in it even though, at
a given time, the society operates through these human beings.
From a macrosociological perspective, individuals are irrelevant.
As a result, the particular individuals who populate a society are
believed to have no direct, enduring influence on the institution
of law. In the macrosociological framework of this article, the
content of law in a society, and the impact of law on patterns of
social activity, are thus expected to be affected no more than
temporarily by the individuals who write and enforce statutes,
administrative agency rules, and court decisions.
Why are individuals unable to have a substantial, permanent
impact on law—at least in a society such as the United States
that has a large, heterogeneous population and a complex set of
institutions? The chief reason is probably that individuals live
their lives in a system and the system changes in response to
system-level forces. Furthermore, individuals have, in historical
terms, just a relatively brief presence in the system, i.e., in a
35
society. A society, on the other hand, lasts to the extent that it
34

Bruce H. Mayhew, Structuralism Versus Individualism: Part 1,
Shadowboxing in the Dark, 59 SOC. FORCES 335, 338–39 (1980).
35
In 2006, life expectancy at birth in the United States was 77.7 years.
Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS
REP., Apr. 17, 2009, at 26 tbl. 7 (combining both sexes and all races) (vol.
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is supported by its institutions, and a society will normally have
this support because it possesses a built-in tendency to persist.
Over the long run, accordingly, the institution of law responds
to, and helps to fulfill, the needs of the system, not the wishes
of the individuals in the system.36
D. The Role of Law
On the surface, the framework I am proposing may seem to
imply that law is merely a puppet of the society in which it
exists and that law performs no significant role in social life.
The framework, however, warrants no such conclusion. If law
were unimportant to society, law would not have lasted. Since
the United States was founded, major changes have occurred in
the concepts and doctrines of law, of course, but notably the
institution of law was not abandoned. Instead, the institution of
law continued to be used, although with revisions to its content,
and it persisted because law was an instrument that had utility to
society.
The durability of law in the United States,37 in short, is
evidence that law does something for society and that the
societal benefits of law are not trivial. Because concepts of law
(including the concept of “the rule of law”) and doctrines
applying these concepts operate within a larger social system,
their sociological functions must be understood in terms of that
system.38 However, if my framework is helpful in understanding
law, the societal contributions made by the concepts and

57, no. 14), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57
_14.pdf.
36
The needs of the system, however, are likely to be manifested
typically in the expressed wishes of individuals. The concept of societal need
is explained in The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 672–77.
37
An indicator of the durability of law in England and the United States
is the commonly used phrase “the Western legal tradition.” As used in the
phrase, the word “tradition” is an activity that has persisted over a
considerable period of time. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2422 (3d ed. 1993).
38
Krygier & Mason, supra note 3, at 9–10.
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doctrines of law in the United States differ appreciably from the
contributions that these concepts and doctrines are widely
believed to make. In my framework, the concept of “the rule of
law” is useful to a society as an ideal,39 but the present meaning
of the concept40 gives the concept undeserved importance
because current assumptions regarding the societal functions of
law are incorrect. A reassessment of the concept is thus
required, even though the reassessment may prove
uncomfortable and will lead to much less emphasis on the “rule
of law.”
What are the societal contributions of law? The contributions
are probably the same in the United States and in other countries
with similar sociological, economic, and demographic
characteristics. At present, unfortunately, the sociology of law
has an insufficient body of empirically grounded knowledge to
provide a definitive list of the contributions that law makes to
society. Nonetheless, a society possessing characteristics similar
to those of the United States seems likely to benefit from law in
at least three important ways: (i) law provides symbols that
endorse prevailing social values, (ii) law contributes to
preserving or improving the reputation of socially and
economically important segments of society, and (iii) law assists
in maintaining trust and perceptions of fairness or, when trust
and perceptions of fairness have been damaged, in rebuilding
them.41 Through these contributions, law strengthens the ties that
individuals have to their society.
Under the above line of reasoning, the function of law in a
complex, heterogeneous society is primarily sociological rather
than economic. This conclusion, if correct, has important
ramifications for understanding the societal bases of law. More
precisely, assuming that law exists mainly for sociological
reasons, the origin and evolution of law can be expected to
39

COTTERRELL, supra note 17, at 271.
See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
41
Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of
Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y, &
ETHICS J. 793, 812, 814–27 (2006) [hereinafter Social Productivity];
Regulation of Mutual Fund Boards of Directors, supra note 20, at 535–36.
40
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develop and change in response to sociological factors, i.e.,
system-level properties and forces that are social in character.
To illustrate, I next consider investment advisers and their
regulation by the federal government.
II. INVESTMENT ADVISERS
What is an investment adviser? Broadly defined, investment
advisers supply investment advice, i.e., guidance on a potential
or an existing commitment of economic resources to any type of
property from which monetary profit is sought. In this article,
however, investment advice is construed more narrowly, and
42
investment advice, while obviously involving investment, is
deemed to be rendered only when the subject of the advice is a
security.43 Investment advisers, then, are concerned with, and
only with, securities.
As will be explained in Part II.B. infra, Congress has
adopted a statute that defines the occupation of “investment
adviser” and authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission to regulate the members of the occupation. The
statute is the Investment Advisers Act (“Act”),44 but before
turning to its provisions, I describe the importance of investment
advisers in the United States.
A. Investment Advisers in the Economy
In general terms, an investment adviser is a party (i.e.,
individual or entity) that makes or recommends decisions to
45
acquire and dispose of securities for particular clients. To be
42

In the present context, the word “investment” refers to “[t]he
conversion of money or circulating capital into some species of property from
which an income or profit is expected to be derived in the ordinary course of
trade or business.” 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 48 (2d ed. 1989).
43
The elements of a security are discussed in Social Productivity, supra
note 41, at 829–32.
44
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006).
45
JEFFREY J. HAAS & STEVEN R. HOWARD, INVESTMENT ADVISER
REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 11–12 (2008).
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within
the
statutory
definition,
the
decisions
and
recommendations, which may involve specific securities (e.g.,
the common stock of corporation X) or a specific type of
security (e.g., common stock in general), must have been
reached through the exercise of judgment.46 Thus, decisions and
recommendations are not investment advice if they arise
mechanically (e.g., from a computer program) and if the human
inputs into the mechanical process are disregarded. However,
the decisions and recommendations that constitute investment
advice are not entirely unfettered because the securities involved
in the advice are, or are to be, owned by another party. An
adviser is an agent for a client who is investing in securities and,
as agent, must act in line with restrictions that the client has
imposed on the type(s) of securities that can be bought and
sold.47
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the
instruments being purchased and sold are securities. Federal
securities statutes do not identify the elements of a security but
48
only list types of securities. Unfortunately, the referent of the
word “security” is neither certain nor constant. Whether or not
an instrument is a security is context-dependent, can differ
between societies at a given point in time, and can change within
a society over time.49 Nonetheless, widespread agreement seems
to exist regarding one element of a security. In particular, the
concept of a security connotes profit,50 and as a result, the
decisions and recommendations of an investment adviser are
primarily, if not solely, aimed at producing economic gain for
46

Id.
See Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 233, 233–34 (1999).
48
In the Advisers Act, the list of securities is in section 202(a)(18). 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
49
Social Productivity, supra note 41, at 829–31.
50
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (concluding that
one criterion for whether an instrument is a security is whether the
motivation for acquiring the instrument is profit); United Hous. Found, Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975) (reasoning that profit has been an
element in “all of the Court’s decisions defining a security”).
47
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the clients of the adviser rather than change in social policies.
How important are investment advisers in the economy of
the United States? Surprisingly, hardly any data exist, but the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) has
estimated that, in 2001, investment advisers in the United States
had discretionary authority over client assets51 totaling nearly
$19 trillion.52 This amount is large in absolute terms, of course,
and it is large in relative terms, too.
The relative size of the assets entrusted to investment
51

An investment adviser has discretion with regard to the account of a
client (i) if the adviser has been authorized by the client to make decisions on
the securities that are to be purchased and sold for the account of the client or
(ii) if the adviser has been authorized by the client to employ the investment
adviser(s) that will make these decisions. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Uniform Application for Investment Advisor Registration, Form
ADV, Glossary 2, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf.
52
Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,841, 60,841
(Sept. 26, 2002). The estimate by the Commission is given only as a whole
number, i.e., $19 trillion. In addition, the estimate is not explicitly stated to
be for investment advisers registered with the Commission. Id. If the estimate
omits advisers registered with states, the total assets being managed by all
investment advisers nationwide would, of course, be larger. An investment
adviser is required to register with the Commission if its “principal office and
place of business” is in a state that does not regulate advisers or if it has as a
client an investment company that is registered with the Commission. Any
other investment adviser cannot register with the Commission unless it
manages assets worth at least $25 million. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2006). An
investment adviser in a state that regulates advisers has the option of
registering with the Commission if it manages assets of at least $25 million
but less than $30 million, and such an investment adviser must register with
the Commission if it manages assets worth $30 million or more. 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203A-1(a) (2009).
Of the approximately $19 trillion being managed by investment advisers
on a discretionary basis, according to the Release, roughly $7 trillion was in
mutual funds. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 67 Fed. Reg. at 60,841
n.2. The estimate of $19 trillion is presumably for 2001 (the calendar year
prior to the Release), because at the end of 2001, the total net assets of
mutual funds were $6.975 trillion. INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACT BOOK 110 tbl.1 (49th ed. 2009), available at http://www.
icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. The total net assets of mutual funds in
2001 were thus very close to the figure for those assets (viz., $7 trillion) that
is given in the Release.
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advisers is illustrated by two economic yardsticks. The first is
the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States.53 In
2001, the year for which the Commission estimated the assets
managed by investment advisers, the United States domestically
produced goods and services worth over $10.1 trillion.54
Consequently, the wealth controlled by investment advisers
during 2001 was, in amount, more than 1.8 times the size of the
GDP of the United States economy. Otherwise stated, the
economy of the United States would have needed about 1.8
years to generate the wealth over which investment advisers had
discretionary management authority in 2001.
GDP, however, may not be the most appropriate gauge of
the relative importance of investment advisers in the economy of
the United States. While the assets controlled by investment
advisers and GDP are both monetary in nature, the former is a
measure of financial resources that the United States has
accumulated—in a sense, a nest egg of the country. GDP, on the
other hand, is a measure of the output of the economy of a
country in a single year from labor and property situated in the
country. Comparing the two measures may be juxtaposing
apples and oranges.
One measure that may be more suitable for judging the
societal significance of investment advisers is the current
monetary value of fixed assets in the United States. Fixed assets
are buildings (residential and non-residential), equipment, and
53

Gross domestic product (GDP) is “the total output of goods and
services produced by labor and property located in the United States, valued
at market prices.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2008 425 (127th ed. 2007). Gross national product (GNP),
on the other hand, is “the output attributable to all labor and property
supplied by United States residents.” Id. at 426. GDP is the output of labor
and property that are within the United States; the labor and property may be
that of residents of the United States or residents of other countries. Carol S.
Carson, Replacing GNP: The Updated System of National Economic
Accounts, BUS. ECON., July, 1992, at 44, 46. GNP is the output of the labor
and property of residents of the United States, but the labor and property may
be situated in any country. Id at 46. GDP has replaced GNP as the chief
measure of economic production in the United States. Id. at 44.
54
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 53, at 429 tbl.645.
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software of private parties and governments.55 Like assets
managed by investment advisers, fixed assets constitute
accumulated wealth, and a comparison of the two is thus likely
to be more appropriate than a comparison of the assets managed
by investment advisers and GDP. Moreover, the two measures
do not overlap in the wealth they capture because they are
different forms of wealth. Assets managed by investment
advisers represent financial wealth; fixed assets represent
nonfinancial wealth.
In 2001, the market value of fixed assets in the United States
was approximately $28.6 trillion.56 The wealth being managed
on a discretionary basis by investment advisers was thus equal to
about two-thirds of the wealth in fixed assets. Because fixed
assets are composed of all buildings, equipment and software,
they are central components of the level of affluence in the
United States, and for every three dollars of fixed assets, there
were two additional dollars under the discretionary management
of investment advisers.
Whichever yardstick is preferred—gross domestic product or
fixed assets—it is clear that the occupation of investment adviser
has become an important component of the financial sector of
the United States. As the Commission has noted, “investment
advisers play a key role in the economic life of America
today.”57 However, securities and the society in which they trade
are inextricably linked, and although the point is not often made
explicitly, the occupation of investment adviser cannot be
divorced from the society in which the occupation functions. As
a result, the occupation has been a topic of legislation by
55

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIXED
ASSETS AND CONSUMER DURABLE GOODS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1925–97
M-5 (2003), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/Fixed_Assets_
1925_97.pdf.
56
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1. Current-Cost Net Stock of
Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods, http://www.bea.gov/national/
FA2004/SelectTable.asp (follow “Table 1.1 Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed
Assets and Consumer Durable Goods” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13,
2010).
57
Investment Adviser Year 2000 Reports, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1339, at *4.
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Congress and, pursuant to the legislation, subject to oversight by
the Commission.
B. Investment Advisers Act
Important federal legislation dealing with securities was not
enacted in the United States until the economic depression of the
1930s.58 In 1933, Congress passed the first piece of legislation,
the Securities Act,59 and a year later adopted the Securities
Exchange Act.60 In 1940, Congress approved the Investment
Advisers Act61 and the Investment Company Act.62 These four
statutes supply most of the foundation for the regulation of
securities and the securities industry in the United States today.
Of the four statutes, however, we will be concerned with just
one—the Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”).
As shown above,63 the occupation of investment adviser is
currently of major significance to the financial sector in the
United States, but the salience of the occupation is not recent.
Investment advisers became a noticeable feature of the sector
initially during the 1930s.64 The expansion of the occupation at
this time has been attributed to the volatility of stock prices that
started in the latter half of 192965 and that caused investors to be
58

Mindy Olson, Note, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act: More Effective Than Current Regulation?, 30 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 425, 427–28 (2005).
59
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (2006)).
60
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006)).
61
Investment Advisers Act, ch. 686, title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006)). The
Investment Advisers Act took effect on November 1, 1940. Id. at title II,
§ 221, 54 Stat. 857 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-21 (2006)).
62
Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006)).
63
See supra Part II.A.
64
S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 21 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27
(1940).
65
A chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each trading day from
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wary of long-term commitments to constant sets of securities.66
Although the exact monetary value of assets managed by
investment advisers in the 1930s is unknown, the amount under
management was believed by Congress to be sufficiently large to
warrant enactment of a statute—the Advisers Act—authorizing
regulation of the occupation by the federal government.67 In
writing the Act, therefore, Congress not surprisingly
incorporated an explicit statement that the impact of the
occupation on the economy in general and the financial sector in
particular had been nationwide in scope and material in degree.68
1. Statutory Definition
Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, stripped of its
statutory exclusions,69 defines an investment adviser as:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part

January 1920 through December 1939 is available at http://stockcharts.
com/charts/historical/djia19201940.html.
66
H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 5 (1939); Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies, Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 1004 (1940) (statement of Research Dep’t,
Ill. Legis. Council), available at HeinOnline, U.S. Federal Legislative
History Library. A study of financial markets has ascribed the shift from
passive to active management of securities portfolios, and the adoption of the
techniques currently used to reduce risk in securities portfolios, to the
volatility of stock prices during the 1970s and to the investment in securities
of large sums by entities at that time. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS:
THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 7–9 (1992). A chart of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each trading day from January 1960
through December 1980 is available at http://stockcharts.com/charts/
historical/djia19601980.html.
67
S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27
(1940).
68
Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2006)).
69
Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A)-(G).
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of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities.70
The above definition (“statutory definition”), like any law
that is designed to achieve breadth, employs concepts of general
application. Given this generality and the resulting ambiguities
in the statutory definition, the staff of the Commission has found
it necessary to publish two interpretations of the definition.71 The
initial interpretation appeared in 1981,72 but a second
interpretation—Release No. IA-1092—superseded it in 1987,
i.e., just six years later.73 Because Release No. IA-1092 is
important to understanding the statutory definition of investment
adviser, a review of pertinent portions of the Release is
warranted.
2. Release No. IA-1092
According to Release IA-1092, a person is an investment
advisor for purposes of the Advisers Act if all of the following
conditions exist:
(i) The person furnishes advice, reports, or analyses that
deal with securities;
70

Id. § 80b-2(a)(11). A “person” can be a human being or an entity. Id.
§ 80b-2(a)(5), -2(a)(16).
71
The interpretations are those of the staff of the Division of Investment
Management. Id. The current structure of the Commission includes five
Divisions and eighteen Offices. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Division and Offices
Homepages, http://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
The Division of Investment Management is responsible for construing the
Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2010).
72
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as an Integral Component of Other Financial Related Services, 46
Fed. Reg. 41,771 (Aug. 18, 1981).
73
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400
(Oct. 16, 1987).
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(ii) The services in (i) constitute a business;74 and
(iii) The services in (i) are supplied for compensation.75
An additional condition, however, is embedded in (i). While
the additional condition is not expressly addressed by the
Release, it is basic to the statutory definition of investment
adviser. The condition, which arises from the construction of the
Advisers Act by the United States Supreme Court,76 recognizes
that advice, reports, and analyses regarding securities—the
services in (i)—can be of different types. For a person to qualify
as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act, however, the
person needs to provide a particular type of service.
Specifically,
(iv) The services in (i) must involve individualized
treatment of the recipient of the services.
Thus, if the services do not take into account the financial and
psychological profile of the person receiving the services—i.e.,
if the services are not tailored to the recipient—the person
delivering the advice, reports or analyses will not be an
investment adviser.77
It is unfortunate that condition (iv) is not discussed in
74

The statutory definition, which is reproduced in the text accompanying
note 70 supra, seems to cover two distinct types of business activity that
differ in, inter alia, frequency. HAAS & HOWARD, supra note 45, at 13. One
type entails a “business” of providing advice on securities; the other type
entails a “regular business” of providing analyses or reports on securities. 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). However, the staff has taken the position that the two
references to business in section 202(a)(11) apply to just a single type of
activity. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at
38,402.
75
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at
38,402.
76
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
77
Id. at 207–08 (“The Act was designed to apply to those persons . . .
who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns, whether by
written or verbal communication.”).
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Release IA-1092.78 An in-depth discussion of this condition
would have probably suggested indicators of the presence or
absence of individualized treatment under the Advisers Act. In
doing so, the discussion would have underscored the prominence
of individualism in the culture of the United States.79
Individualism, often a concomitant or component of privacy, is
manifested in doctrines of U.S. law on a variety of topics,
including
employment
discrimination,80
immigration,81
pornography,82 sexuality and reproduction,83 and violent crime.84
Individualism also forms a cornerstone of U.S. law on
securities,85 and its appearance in the Advisers Act, therefore,
should not be unexpected.
Condition (iv), however, is not alone in having relevance to
the macrosociological framework of this article. Conditions
(ii) and (iii) are pertinent, too. With regard to (ii)—which
focuses on the business element of the statutory definition—the
Release concludes that a person is engaged in the business of
being an investment adviser if the person makes public
representations that the person is an investment adviser, if the
person receives identifiable compensation that is linked to
furnishing advice on securities, or if the person other than
sporadically provides clients with recommendations, analyses or
78

The Release, in answering question (i), refers to a recipient of the
services as a client. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial
Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg.
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987). The Release, accordingly, may have
implicitly recognized question (iv) and incorporated the position of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lowe.
79
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1526 (2005)
(finding with data from the World Values Survey that, among twenty-five
countries, the United States had the highest level of individualism).
80
See The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 631–35.
81
E.g., McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1960).
82
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
83
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1972).
84
E.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
85
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of
Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 486 (2003).
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reports focusing on particular securities or particular types of
securities.86 Because the Release separates these conditions with
the word “or,” it contemplates that any one of the conditions
will suffice to create a business under the Advisers Act.87
The Release, of course, is an interpretation of a statute by an
administrative agency, and as such, it is not binding on the
judiciary.88 If Congress has not defined a word in a statute,
federal courts rather than federal executive-branch agencies are
the ultimate arbiters of the meaning of the word.89 Notably,
neither the Advisers Act itself90 nor the legislative history of the
Act91 supplies a definition of the word “business.” To date,
moreover, no federal court seems to have departed from the
Release when interpreting the word “business” in the Advisers
Act definition of investment adviser, but inasmuch as the
judiciary is not compelled to follow the Release, the judiciary
may eventually assign to the word “business” the meaning that
was generally accepted in the United States when the Advisers
Act was adopted.92 Indeed, the meaning of the word “business”
to the public at the time the statutory definition was incorporated
into the Advisers Act may be preferred by the judiciary93
inasmuch as Congress has not altered the definition since

86

Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers
Act, 52 Fed. Reg. at 38,402.
87
Id.
88
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983).
89
See Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 182–84 (2004).
90
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (2006).
91
S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 20-22 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27–
28 (1940).
92
See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 123–24 (6th ed. 2000).
93
Bedroc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 184. In ascertaining the referents of three
words in a section of the Securities Exchange Act, the U.S. Supreme Court
has relied on a dictionary published in the year the Act was adopted by
Congress. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20, 21 (1976).
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formulating it in 1940.94
A reason for believing that the general understanding of the
word “business” in 1940 comports more fully with
congressional intent than the criteria for the existence of a
business95 that were developed by the staff of the Commission is
that the two Releases were issued by the staff in the 1980s. The
Advisers Act, however, was adopted by Congress in 1940, four
decades
earlier. Because the Releases reflect social and
economic conditions at the time they were written, their criteria
for a business cannot be blindly accepted. On the contrary, their
criteria should be approached with some skepticism.
If the judiciary were to construe the word “business” in
accordance with the way the word was employed in public
discourse when Congress approved the Advisers Act, what
would be the meaning of the word? According to two
dictionaries published in the first half of the 1930s, a period
close to the year (1940) in which the Act was adopted,
“business” includes:
“Any particular occupation or employment habitually
engaged in, esp. for livelihood or gain.”96
“12. A person’s official or professional duties as a
whole; stated occupation, profession, or trade. 13. In
general sense: Action which occupies time, demands
attention and labour; esp. serious occupation, work, as
opposed to pleasure or recreation . . . . 14.b. A

94

Compare Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, title II,
§ 202(a)(11), 54 Stat. 847, 848 (1940) with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
95
The criteria can be found in Applicability of the Investment Advisers
Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons who
Provide Investment Advisory Services as an Integral Component of Other
Financial Related Services, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,771, 41,772–73 (Aug. 18, 1981)
and in Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400,
38,402–03 (Oct. 16, 1987).
96
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 296–97 (1932) (def. 2.b).
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particular occupation; a trade or profession.”97
To combine the above, a business is a recurring,98 profitseeking activity of a person (human being or entity). In addition,
the society in which the activity occurs must identify the activity
as a business rather than as a form of relaxation or a means of
amusement. A business, consequently, has the purpose of
obtaining an economic return and is an activity that society
classifies as a business.
The preceding composite of the dictionary meanings
(“composite”), however, is at variance with the position taken
by the Release. In this regard, two of the factors listed in the
Release are pertinent. First, public representations by a person
that the person is an investment adviser suffice to put the person
into business as an investment adviser.99 Second, the receipt of
compensation for furnishing advice on securities is enough to
cause a person to be in business as an investment adviser.100
According to the Release, either factor by itself creates a
business.101
Unlike the Release, the composite of the dictionary
definitions does not allow any one factor to cause an activity to
be a business. Under the composite, a person would be in the
business of being an investment adviser only if the person
actually furnished clients with advice, reports, or analyses
dealing with securities; if the person did so repeatedly (i.e., on a
regular basis); and if the person expected or accepted a
monetary payment for these activities. To illustrate the
composite, a company that publicly portrays itself as an
investment adviser would not be in the investment adviser
business unless it actually has clients and serves them as an
investment adviser. Similarly, an individual would not be in the
97

1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1205 (1933).
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp.
3, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining words in a section of the Investment
Company Act and observing that the word “‘Business’ implies continued
activity”), aff’d, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
99
Supra note 86 and accompanying text.
100
Id.
101
Id.
98
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investment adviser business under the composite simply because
he or she is paid, or expects to be paid, a sum of money for
acting as an investment adviser to a single client on a single
occasion. If the position adopted in the Release is used, on the
other hand, both the company and the individual would be in the
investment adviser business.
Before leaving the composite, a final point merits emphasis.
Under the composite, a necessary condition for an activity to be
designated a business is that the society in which the activity
takes place must label the activity as a business rather than as
entertainment. However, a society has latitude in how it
classifies and deals with phenomena. Thus, a society may
consider a particular activity to be unacceptable, as in the case
of prostitution, and when it does so, it will attempt to eliminate
the activity through informal means and/or through law.102 On
the other hand, a society may not be cognizant of or concerned
with the impact of a phenomenon that is materially affecting it.
An illustration is the size and continuing growth of population, a
topic that is relevant to the content of law because population
density shapes law.103 In recent decades, the population of the
world has been increasing by more than three-quarters of a
billion people every ten years,104 but the ramifications of
population growth in the United States105 and elsewhere for
102

As of 2006, prostitution was unlawful in every state of the United
States except in certain counties of Nevada and except in certain
circumstances in Rhode Island. Lauren M. Davis, Prostitution, 7 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 835, 836–37 (2006).
103
E.g., Kenneth D. Wald et al., The Politics of Gay Rights in American
Communities: Explaining Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, 40 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 1152 (1996).
104
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TOTAL MIDYEAR POPULATION FOR THE
WORLD: 1950–2050 (2009), http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.
php. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the population of the world was
4.3 billion in 1978 and 6.7 billion in 2008. Id.
105
The resident population of the United States, according to the
decennial census, was 151.3 million in April 1950 and 281.4 million in April
2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 53, at 7 tbl.1. The U.S. resident
population is estimated to have been 307.0 million on July 1, 2009. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR

BARNETT REVISED.DOC

568

6/28/2010 2:29 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

economic prosperity and social stability106 are not currently
attracting much attention among Americans.107
The way in which a phenomenon is perceived by a society,
in short, does not depend solely on the nature of the
phenomenon. It is also a function of societal conditions,
including the cultural dimensions of social life, and in this sense,
the problems that confront a society are socially constructed.108
For the Advisers Act, the social character of societal
designations means that whether a particular undertaking is
deemed to be a “business”—and, as discussed infra, whether the
undertaking is “for compensation” and whether an item is
compensation—depends on circumstances in the society that
hosts the undertaking. Unfortunately, the sociological variables
bearing on whether an activity is considered to be the business
of investment advising are unknown and will remain so until
they have been the subject of rigorous research.
Finally, we consider condition (iii)—the compensation
element—in the statutory definition of investment adviser. While
the condition does not require a lengthy exploration, two points
should be made. First, insofar as compensation is economic in
nature—a position that seems to be taken by the Release109—it is
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO
JULY 1, 2009 (2009), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
106
JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEED 6–7 (2005) (finding that human population growth was a factor
causing the disappearance of societies in the past).
107
Derek Seabury Hoff, Are We Too Many? The Population Debate and
Policymaking in the Twentieth-Century United States 10-12 (Jan. 2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with
Widener University Library). The present failure to address the problem of
U.S. population growth also characterizes scholarship on law. A notable
exception is Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2007).
108
Joseph W. Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist
View, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 210–12 (1985) (examining social problems as
societal constructs).
109
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400,
38,403 (Oct. 16, 1987); HAAS & HOWARD, supra note 45, at 16.
THE
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a component of a business, which is condition (ii).110 Thus, when
compensation is economic, its treatment as a separate element is
unnecessary.111
The second point involves the matter of whether all
compensation is economic. In this regard, it is pertinent that
section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act forbids a person
who is affiliated with a Commission-registered investment
company from accepting non-salary or non-wage compensation
for selling property to, or buying property from, the investment
company if, in the transaction, the affiliated person is an
agent.112 Notably, section 17(e)(1) is part of a statute that was a
companion to the Advisers Act,113 and both in section 17(e)(1)
and in section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, Congress
110

Supra note 86 and accompanying text.
The Release raises a further point when, in discussing the
compensation element, it refers to “the receipt of any economic benefit,” to
whether a “fee is charged,” and to whether compensation is “paid.”
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services
as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at 38,403. The
statutory definition of investment adviser requires only that covered activities
be “for compensation.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the compensation element of the statutory definition is
probably satisfied not only by a receipt/payment of compensation but also by
an expectation of compensation. Whether such an expectation is present in a
situation undoubtedly depends in part on social convention and culture.
112
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (2006). The wording of section 17(e)(1) has
not been amended since the Investment Company Act was adopted in 1940.
Compare Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, § 17(e)(1), 54 Stat. 789,
816 (1940) with 15 U.S.C. § 17(e)(1) (2006). Section 17(e)(1) covers both a
“first-tier” affiliated person (i.e., a person affiliated with a registered
investment company) and a “second-tier” affiliated person (i.e., a person
affiliated with a first-tier affiliated person). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1).
“Affiliated person” is defined in section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company
Act. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3) (2006).
113
The Investment Company Act and the Advisers Act were included in
Public Law No. 76-768. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54
Stat. 789 (1940); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, 54 Stat.
847 (1940). The stated purpose of Public Law No. 76-768 was inter alia “[t]o
provide for the registration and regulation of investment companies and
investment advisers . . . .” 54 Stat. at 789.
111
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incorporated compensation as an element. Neither piece of
legislation defines the word “compensation,” but inasmuch as
the two statutes were adopted together, Congress is unlikely to
have wanted the word to be defined in one way in the
Investment Company Act and in a different way in the Advisers
Act.
Because an affiliate of an investment company includes the
investment adviser to the company,114 section 17(e)(1) covers
investment advisers to registered investment companies.115 Under
existing case law, an item is compensation under section
17(e)(1) as long as the item is thought to be a benefit by the
person accepting it,116 i.e., the attractiveness of an item to a
person determines whether, for that person, the item constitutes
compensation. Of course, while an item may be attractive for an
economic reason, it may also be attractive for a reason that is
not economic. Therefore, an item would apparently qualify as
compensation under section 17(e)(1) even if it has no significant
economic (e.g., monetary) value as long as it has significant
psychological (e.g., emotional) value or significant social (e.g.,
reputational) value to the person who wants or receives it.117
114

15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(E) (2006). The adviser is a first-tier
affiliated person of the investment company. Id.
115
Officers, employees, and directors of an investment adviser are
affiliated with the investment adviser. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (2006). As firsttier affiliated persons of the investment adviser, they are second-tier affiliated
persons of an investment company that is served by the adviser. Section
17(e)(1) covers both first-tier and second-tier affiliated persons of a registered
investment company. Supra note 112. Consequently, if an investment
company is registered with the Commission, section 17(e)(1) applies not only
to its investment adviser but also to the officers, employees, and directors of
the adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1).
116
United States v. Ostrander, 999 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1993).
117
Ostrander, 999 F.2d at 31. This conclusion, which is derived from
case law, is consistent with definitions of “compensation” in dictionaries
published shortly before the Investment Company Act was adopted. The
Investment Company Act was enacted in 1940, as was the Advisers Act. Ch.
686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 & title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940). Definitions in a
contemporary dictionary are evidence of the meaning of words in a statute.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 & nn.20, 21 (1976).
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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Assuming that Congress wanted the word “compensation” to
have the same meaning in section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act
as it has in section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act, a
person could become an investment adviser either from
compensation that is economic or from compensation that is not
economic. If this conclusion is correct—i.e., if compensation
under section 202(a)(11) can be economic or non-economic—the
statutory definition of investment adviser fits comfortably within
a macrosociological framework. For example, the relative appeal
of money versus an item other than money evidently varies
across subcultures within a society,118 and the relative appeal of
one type of non-money item versus another is almost certainly a
function of culture, too.119 If these propositions are correct, the
LANGUAGE 455, 1784 (1932) defines “compensation” to include “[t]hat
which constitutes, or is regarded as, an equivalent or recompense,” and
defines “recompense” as a noun to encompass “[a]n equivalent returned for
anything done, suffered, or given.” A synonym listed for “compensation”
and for “recompense” is “reward.” Id. Accord, 2 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 717 (1933) (definitions 1 and 2 of “compensation); 8 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 259 (1933) (definition 3 of “recompense” in its
substantive sense). Under the foregoing definitions, compensation can be noneconomic.
118
See R. L. Stirrat, Money, Men and Women, in MONEY AND THE
MORALITY OF EXCHANGE 94, 98–99 (J. Parry & M. Bloch eds., 1989)
(describing differences between women and men in money-related views and
behavior in a village in Sri Lanka). Cf. Celia J. Falicov, The Cultural
Meanings of Money: The Case of Latinos and Anglo-Americans, 45 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 313, 314, 321, 326 (2001) (contending that social
considerations, especially ties within nuclear and extended families, are more
important as incentives to working-class Latinos in the United States than to
middle-class Anglo-Americans and that the uses of money accordingly differ
between the two subcultures). See generally Maurice Bloch & Jonathan
Parry, Introduction: Money and the Morality of Exchange, in MONEY AND
THE MORALITY OF EXCHANGE, supra, at 1, 1 (concluding from
anthropological studies that the way money is viewed and used is not the
same in all cultures); Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money:
“Special Monies,” 95 AM. J. SOCIOL. 342, 351 (1989) (contending that the
uses, users, allocation, and sources of money in a society are affected by
culture and social structure).
119
Cf. Stacey Menzel Baker et al., From Despicable to Collectible: The
Evolution of Collective Memories for and the Value of Black Advertising
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issue of whether a person satisfies the compensation element (as
well as other elements) of the statutory definition of investment
adviser is not determined by factors internal to the institution of
law but by factors external to the institution. The latter factors
can be expected to include mainly macrosociological variables.
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ANTECEDENTS OF LAW
A premise of this article is that law does not arise randomly
but is anchored in society. Under this view, the concepts and
doctrines of law that are central to a society are not attributable
to individuals and personalities, but are explained instead by
sociological, demographic, and/or economic conditions in the
society. However, the premise requires appreciably more
empirical support than it currently possesses.120 Relevant
evidence seems likely to be produced by research on the societal
factors that may lie behind the conditions that are the immediate
antecedents shaping regulatory law (i.e., law designed to
suppress or encourage a particular type of activity). If a factor
that potentially affects an immediate antecedent of regulatory
law can be measured quantitatively, a multivariate statistical test
Memorabilia, 33 J. ADVERTISING 37 (2004) (describing a type of item whose
appeal changed over time in the United States). See generally Geert Hofstede
& Robert R. McCrae, Personality and Culture Revisited: Linking Traits and
Dimensions of Culture, 38 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 52, 62–64, 79 (2004)
(finding that differences in culture are associated with differences in
personality and hypothesizing that the former produce the latter).
120
The most persuasive of the empirical studies that support the premise
are summarized in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological
Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13. A recently published study has found
that higher rates of homicide in U.S. counties lower the probability that
defendants charged with homicide will be convicted; for defendants who are
convicted, higher rates of homicide shorten the prison terms imposed. Mark
Cooney & Callie Harbin Burt, Less Crime, More Punishment, 114 AM. J.
SOCIOL. 491 (2008). Homicide, accordingly, seems to be undeterred by
punishment through the institution of law, i.e., by conviction and
imprisonment. Id. at 494–95, 514. This finding is consistent with the
evidence from social science research that, in a society, patterns of social
activity materially affect, but are not materially affected by, the institution of
law. Supra note 20.
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can ascertain whether the factor is related to the antecedent and
can estimate the strength of any relationship found.
In Part II supra, I examined federal law on the occupation of
investment adviser as an example of regulation by government.
This law and the occupation it regulates were intended to be a
case study, and the regulation of investment advisers was
reviewed on the assumption that law concerned with one type of
activity can lead to an understanding of the antecedents of
regulatory law on multiple types of activity that are important to
society. Notably, the Advisers Act embodies a concern with
morality,121 a concern whose presence in the Act should not be
surprising since law generally is grounded in morality.122 Any
factor that molds morality, therefore, is likely to help in
explaining the development and disappearance of law-based
regulation directed at the many activities in a society that are
tied to morality.
In this Part of the article, I present an analysis of
quantitative data that was undertaken to identify factors that may
affect whether morality is classified by adults in the United
States as a public issue or a private matter. Because law in a
democracy eventually incorporates prevailing morality, law and
morality cannot be divorced. However, the assignment of a
morality-linked form of behavior to the public sphere or to the
private sphere is critical to the presence or absence of regulatory
law addressing such behavior. The factors that are responsible
for defining morally relevant behavior as public or private thus
potentially account for whether law exists to regulate the
behavior.
The data that I analyzed are from the General Social Survey
(“GSS”). The GSS, which began in 1972, annually or biennially
samples adults residing in the United States and, through faceto-face interviews, gathers information on a wide range of
topics. The topics covered by the GSS, however, are not
identical in every survey. The data for the instant study are
121

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963).
122
Don Welch, The State As a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 540, 542–43, 549 (1988).
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from the GSS that was conducted in 1991 because of the set of
variables measured in that year. The 1991 GSS used multi-stage
cluster sampling to choose blocks of dwelling units and then,
within chosen blocks, quota sampling to select individuals. In
1991, the GSS was confined to English-speaking residents.123
A. Variables
The dependent variable—the phenomenon that I sought to
explain—was derived from responses to two questions in the
1991 GSS that focus on a fundamental dimension of social life,
and I therefore regard the responses as measures of values rather
than of opinions.124 The GSS assigns mnemonic labels to its
variables, and the labels for the two questions that formed the
basis of the dependent variable in my study were PERRIGHT and
SOCRIGHT. The wording of each question is reproduced in Table
1, and as is evident from their wording, both questions dealt
with morality. In the sociology of law, morality and the factors
that affect it are important subjects for research because different
views of morality are central to divisive issues facing
government125 and because law will not usually regulate an
activity in a democratic society unless the society considers the
activity to be immoral126 and public.127 Although PERRIGHT and
123

NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–
2008: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 2188 (2009), http://www.norc.org/GSS+
Website/Documentation (follow “Final 2008 GSS Codebook” hyperlink).
124
Social values and opinions are defined and distinguished as concepts
in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note
22, at 14.
125
Christopher Z. Mooney & Richard G. Schuldt, Does Morality Policy
Exist? Testing a Basic Assumption, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 199, 204 tbl.1, 209
tbl.5, 210 & tbl.6 (2008).
126
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he law . . . is
constantly based on notions of morality.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 196 (1986). The holding in Bowers—that a statute prohibiting private
same-sex sexual relations is not unconstitutional—was overruled seventeen
years later in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). However, the
Court in Bowers was not incorrect in writing that the substance of morality
shapes the doctrines of law. Following the decision in Bowers in 1986, the
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concentrated on morality in general rather than on the
morality of a specific type of behavior, the general is likely to
inform the specific, and the antecedents of morality in its
generic form can be expected to offer insight into the content of
law at a particular time and change in law over time.
Respondents who agreed with PERRIGHT and disagreed with
SOCRIGHT were assumed to consider morality a private matter;
conversely, respondents who disagreed with PERRIGHT and
agreed with SOCRIGHT were assumed to view morality as a
public issue.128 To capture the dimension that links PERRIGHT and
SOCRIGHT, a new variable was created, and on the new variable,
the former respondents were coded 1 and the latter respondents
were coded 0. The new variable was labeled MORALITY and was
used in the regression model as the dependent variable.
Respondents who could not be coded 1 or 0 on MORALITY—e.g.,
respondents who agreed both with PERRIGHT and with
SOCRIGHT—were omitted from the analysis. As a result, the use
of MORALITY as the dependent variable imposed on the data
SOCRIGHT

belief that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable alternative
lifestyle” became increasingly frequent among adults in the United States,
and by 1999, a slight majority held this belief. Public Agenda, Acceptance of
Homosexuality Has Grown Significantly, http://www.publicagenda.org/
charts/acceptance-homosexuality-has-grown-significantly-0 (last visited Feb.
14, 2010). Morality has been defined as the “conduct conforming to the
customs or accepted standards of a particular culture or group.” WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1469 (3d ed. 1993). As so defined,
the state of morality at the time of Lawrence forms a foundation of the
holding of the Supreme Court in the case.
127
See Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework,
supra note 22, at 15–18.
128
Interviewees whose response was “strongly agree” or “agree” were
classified as having agreed; interviewees whose response was “disagree” or
“strongly disagree” were classified as having disagreed.
PERRIGHT was answered by 1,287 interviewees, 315 of whom stated
that they “neither agree nor disagree” or that they “don’t know.” SOCRIGHT
was answered by 1,282 interviewees, 368 of whom stated that they “neither
agree nor disagree” or that they “don’t know.” Calculated from NAT’L
OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 1812. A total of 638
interviewees gave one of the foregoing answers to PERRIGHT and/or to
SOCRIGHT. These 638 interviewees were not included in the data analysis.
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analysis a ceiling of 305 respondents, of whom 145 were coded
1 and 160 were coded 0.
Table 1. Variables in Regression Model129

Mnemonic label
of GSS question

Measurement of variable

Dependent
variable:
MORALITY

was measured as a dummy
variable (i.e., respondents were coded 0 or
1) based on the answers to PERRIGHT and
SOCRIGHT. Respondents who disagreed with
PERRIGHT and agreed with SOCRIGHT were
coded 0 on MORALITY. Respondents who
agreed with PERRIGHT and disagreed with
SOCRIGHT were coded 1 on MORALITY.
MORALITY

Components of
MORALITY:
PERRIGHT

“Do you agree or disagree with the
following statements . . . . Right and wrong
should be a matter of personal conscience.”
(GSS question #1530C.)

SOCRIGHT

“Do you agree or disagree with the
following statements . . . . Right and wrong
should be decided by society.” (GSS
question #1530B.)

129

The question numbers shown in the table are from NAT’L OPINION
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123.
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Independent
variables:
AGE

Age of the respondent in years. (GSS
question #13.) In the data analysis, AGE was
a variable with three categories. Respondents
who were eighteen to forty-four years of age
were coded 1; respondents who were fortyfive to sixty-four years of age were coded 2;
and respondents who were sixty-five years of
age or older were coded 3.

BORN

“Were you born in this country?” (GSS
question #31.) In the data analysis, BORN was
a dummy variable. Respondents who
answered “yes” were coded 0, and
respondents who answered “no” were coded
1.

EDUC

The number of years of formal schooling that
a respondent reported she or he had
completed. (GSS question #15.) In the data
analysis, EDUC was a dummy variable.
Respondents who had finished no more than
twelve years of schooling were coded 0, and
respondents who had finished at least thirteen
years of schooling were coded 1.

FATALISM

“Do you agree or disagree with the
following . . . There is little that people can
do to change the course of their lives.” (GSS
question #1517B.) In the data analysis,
FATALISM
was
a
dummy
variable.
Respondents were coded 0 if they answered
“strongly agree” or “agree,” and they were
coded 1 if they answered “disagree” or
“strongly disagree.”
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PRAYFREQ

“Now thinking about the present, about how
often do you pray?” (GSS question #1526.)
In the data analysis, PRAYFREQ was a
variable with three categories. Respondents
were coded 1 if they reported praying
“never,” “less than once a year,” “about
once or twice a year,” or “several times a
year.” Respondents were coded 2 if they
reported praying “about once a month,”
“two to three times a month,” “nearly every
week,” “every week,” or “several times a
week.” Respondents were coded 3 if they
reported praying “once a day” or “several
times a day.”

RACE

Race of the respondent as reported by the
respondent. (GSS question #24.) In the data
analysis, RACE was a dummy variable.
Respondents who reported that they were
“White” were coded 0, and respondents who
reported that they were “Black” were coded
1.

REALINC

Family income of the respondent in constant
(1986) dollars. (GSS question #1738.) In the
data analysis, REALINC was a dummy
variable. Respondents were coded 0 if their
family income was less than $20,000 and
were coded 1 if their family income was
$20,000 or more.

SEX

Sex of the respondent. (GSS question #23.)
In the data analysis, SEX was a dummy
variable. Males were coded 0, and females
were coded 1.

TRUST

“Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can’t
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be too careful in life.” (GSS question
#163A.) In the data analysis, TRUST was a
dummy variable. Respondents who believed
that “most people can be trusted” were
coded 0, and respondents who believed that
“you can’t be too careful” were coded 1.
XNORCSIZ

Level of urbanization of the place of
residence of the respondent. (GSS question
52B.) In the data analysis, XNORCSIZ was a
variable with three categories. Respondent’s
place of residence was coded 1 if it was “not
within an SMSA, (within a county)” and was
one of the following: “open country within
larger civil divisions,” “an incorporated area
less than 2,500 or an unincorporated area of
1,000 to 2,499,” “a town or village (2,500
to 9,999),” or “a small city (10,000 to
49,999).” Respondent’s place of residence
was coded 2 if it was “within an SMSA” and
was one of the following: “an unincorporated
area of a medium central city,” “an
unincorporated area of a large central city
(division, township, etc.),” “a suburb of a
medium size central city,” or “a suburb of a
large central city.” Respondent’s place of
residence was coded 3 if it was “within an
SMSA” and was one of the following: “a
medium size central city (50,000 to
250,000)” or “a large central city (over
250,000).” SMSA is the acronym for a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

What variables (“independent variables”) are promising as
explanations of the dependent variable in the instant study? The
combination of already published research on the antecedents of
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law on specific topics,130 other pertinent social science
research,131 and existing law on investment advisers132 suggest
two sets of independent variables. One set structures (e.g.,
stratifies) a societal system, and the other set is comprised of
dimensions of its culture.133 Table 1 presents the variables in the
two sets, the questions in the 1991 GSS that were used for the
variables, and the manner in which each variable was measured
in the instant study. A maximum of three categories were
employed for an independent variable because, as discussed
infra in Part III.B., the number of respondents in the data
analysis was relatively small. Three-category independent
variables were assumed to be interval scales.134
130

A summary of the most credible of these studies is in Public-Private
Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13.
131
JAMES A. DAVIS, BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND OPINIONS IN THE
1972-1977 NORC GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS: TEN GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT
AGE, EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE, RACE, RELIGION, AND SEX,
AND FORTY-NINE OPINION ITEMS (1979), http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/
gss/DOCUMENTS/REPORTS/Topical_Reports/TR02.pdf.
132
Supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
133
In the instant article, the word “culture” refers to the fundamental
assumptions that shape the perceptions and behavior of the members of a
society. Edgar H. Schein, Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization
Studies, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 236 (1996).
134
An explanation of scale types—nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio—
is in Anwer Khurshid & Hardeo Sahai, Scales of Measurements: An
Introduction and a Selected Bibliography, 27 QUALITY & QUANTITY 303,
304–05, 308–10 (1993). Although the scale types have been clearly defined,
universal agreement is lacking on the criteria for determining the scale type
of a particular measurement procedure. Id. at 311–12. Moreover, evidence
exists that, when three or more ordered categories are used to measure an
independent variable, the advantages of treating the categories as an interval
scale (rather than an ordinal scale) outweigh the disadvantages. Sanford
Labovitz, The Assignment of Numbers to Rank Order Categories, 35 AM.
SOCIOL. REV. 515 (1970); Mark Traylor, Ordinal and Interval Scaling, 25 J.
MARKET RES. SOC’Y 297 (1983). In general, then, three or more ordered
categories should be considered an interval scale unless there is a specific
reason for using them as an ordinal scale.
In analyzing data, a reference category is needed for an independent
variable that is measured with an ordinal scale. J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY
FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES
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For the first set of independent variables—i.e., the structural
variables—the regression equation included factors that have
been significant in organizing the societal system in the United
States. Each of the variables, accordingly, has important social
correlates and consequences. The variables were the
respondent’s age (AGE),135 educational attainment (EDUC),
national origin (BORN), race (RACE), family income (REALINC),
and sex (SEX) as well as the degree of urbanization of the area
where the respondent resided (XNORCSIZ). Because of their
importance in society, structural features such as the foregoing
have traditionally been the core of the discipline of sociology136
and cannot be ignored in any effort to explain social values that
differentiate private from public in morality as an antecedent of
regulatory law.
The second set of independent variables in the regression
USING STATA 415–18 (2d ed. 2006). A reference category is not required
with an interval scale (or a ratio scale). In data analyses in a pair of earlier
studies, I employed ordered three-category independent variables as interval
scales by not having a reference category for each variable, but I incorrectly
referred to the categories as ordinal scales. Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at
320 n.166; The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 655 n.140. Especially
because the categories for each of these independent variables were derived
from a ratio scale, the categories were justifiably used as interval scales.
135
In general, age differences in social values probably result from
differences between generations in educational attainment, i.e., age itself
probably has little effect on most social values. See DAVIS, supra note 131, at
62. Aging, on the other hand, can affect values. Nicholas L. Danigelis et al.,
Population Aging, Intracohort Aging, and Sociopolitical Attitudes, 72 AM.
SOCIOL. REV. 812 (2007); David J. Harding & Christopher Jencks, Changing
Attitudes Toward Premarital Sex: Cohort, Period, and Aging Effects, 67 PUB.
OPINION Q. 211, 225 (2003). The effect of the aging process on values can
be measured with cross-sectional data from sample surveys, but only if the
surveys have been conducted in different years and cover a substantial time
span. The effect of aging cannot be measured using information on age from
a single survey. GSS surveys have not gathered the data required to assess
the possible influence of the aging process on MORALITY. See NAT’L OPINION
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at app. U.
136
Xavier Hansen, Back to the Future: The Origins and Return of
Sociology as the Scientific Study of Societal Development (Aug. 2004)
(unpublished paper presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association) (on file with author).
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model included modes of thought and conduct that are cultural
dimensions of a society. Whether law seeks to regulate a
particular activity is evidently a function in part of culture, i.e.,
of how the participants in a society perceive, and hence react to,
their social world. For example, public support for a state law
banning same-sex marriage is higher when same-sex marriage is
seen as jeopardizing traditional social values regarding family
and sex roles.137 Because law is shaped by morality and because
morality is a function of culture, the content of law can be
expected to respond to and incorporate the content of culture.
The variables employed in the regression model as aspects or
indicators of culture were the respondent’s beliefs as to whether
individuals are in control of their lives (FATALISM) and whether
trust in people is warranted (TRUST). An additional cultural
variable was the frequency of prayer by respondents
(PRAYFREQ), which was assumed to be a measure of the moregeneral factor of religiousness. While no quantitative study
seems to have been done on the relationship between any of
these three independent variables and the dependent variable in
the instant study, such relationships are suggested by logic
and/or by some empirical research. The view that morality is a
private issue, and thus a subject that is inappropriate for
regulation by government, seemed likely to vary with inter alia
(i) the belief that the participants in the society are able to
manage their future,138 (ii) a belief by participants in the
trustworthiness of other participants,139 and (iii) commitment to
137

Rory McVeigh & Maria-Elena D. Diaz, Voting to Ban Same-Sex
Marriage: Interests, Values, and Communities, 74 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 891,
907 (2009).
138
Among individuals, degree of fatalism and at least one aspect of
morality depend in part on degree of self-direction. Carmi Schooler et al.,
Occupational Self-Direction, Intellectual Functioning, and Self-Directed
Orientation in Older Workers: Findings and Implications for Individuals and
Societies, 110 AM. J. SOCIOL. 161, 185 fig.4 (2004). Fatalism and morality,
therefore, are correlated in some ways and to some extent.
139
Trust among the members of a group having a subsistence economy
seems to be necessary for the group to survive. See W. G. Runciman, Stone
Age Sociology, 11 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 129, 134–35 (2005)
(contending that during the Stone Age the survival of a group depended on
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religion.140
B. Data Analysis
In the instant study, maximum-likelihood logit coefficients
were estimated for the independent variables in the regression
model. Linear (least squares) regression could not be used
because the dependent variable was dichotomized; a dataset with
such a dependent variable requires logistic regression.141 Given
the use of logistic regression and the coding employed for the
dependent variable, the regression coefficient and odds ratio
computed for an independent variable express, for each change
in category on the independent variable, the change in the odds
that morality was regarded as private.142 In this regard, the
reader should keep two points in mind. First, the regression
coefficient and odds ratio for an independent variable estimate
the impact of that independent variable on MORALITY while
holding constant the effects of the other independent variables in
the regression model. Second, an independent variable that
cooperation among its members and the expectation of such cooperation). Not
surprisingly, therefore, research has found that trust broadly affects other
types of groups, including social systems that are affluent and complex.
Social Productivity, supra note 41, at 825–27. In light of this research, a
relationship between trust and morality is plausible a priori.
140
See Ramona Houmanfar et al., Religion and Cultural Survival, 51
PSYCHOL. REC. 19, 27–28 (2001) (discussing the link between religion and
morality).
141
FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1–10 (2000); Alfred
DeMaris, A Tutorial in Logistic Regression, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 956,
957–58 (1995).
142
An understanding of logistic regression requires that two concepts—
probability and odds—be distinguished. A probability is a proportion, while
odds are a ratio of two probabilities. PAMPEL, supra note 141, at 11–13. As
explained infra in Part III-B of the text, the regression results reported in
Table 2 and Table 3 are based on data for 162 interviewees. Of the 162, 76
were coded 1 on MORALITY and 86 were coded 0. Therefore, the probability
that morality would be regarded as private by an interviewee in this group
was 76 ÷ 162 = .469, the probability that morality would be regarded as
public was 86 ÷ 162 = .531, and the odds that morality would be regarded
as private was .469 ÷ .531 = .883.
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increases the likelihood that morality will be deemed private
evidently reduces the likelihood that regulatory law will be
adopted. In the United States, an activity is not explicitly
addressed by law, or is explicitly protected by law from
regulation, when the activity is designated as private by a
substantial share of the population.143
Because the GSS selected interviewees with cluster
sampling—i.e., because the GSS sampled sets of individuals144—
an adjustment was made to the standard errors that were
calculated by the statistics program (Stata) in estimating the
regression coefficients.145 Specifically, each standard error from
the estimation by Stata was multiplied by the square root of
1.42, i.e., by 1.19, in an attempt to remedy the effect of the
sampling design.146 Tables 2 and 3 infra report the regression
143

Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra
note 22, at 15–18.
144
See Wikipedia, Cluster Sampling, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluster
_sampling (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
145
The coefficients and their unadjusted standard errors were estimated
with Stata Release 10.0 using the LOGIT command. 2 STATACORP., STATA
BASE REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 10 178–93 (2007) [hereinafter STATA
REFERENCE MANUAL]. The estimation procedure did not employ either
sampling weights or household-size weights. Sampling weights for the GSS
require data on the cluster variable. STATACORP., STATA USER’S GUIDE:
RELEASE 10 § 20.17.3, at 280 (2007). Data on the cluster variable, however,
were not available. The adjustment that was made to the estimated standard
errors, as described in the text, is an imprecise way of compensating for the
omission of sampling weights and the cluster variable.
Household-size weights were considered unnecessary because they are
unlikely to alter materially the results obtained when analyzing GSS data. C.
BRUCE STEPHENSON, WEIGHTING THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS FOR BIAS
RELATED TO HOUSEHOLD SIZE 1 (1978), available at http://publicdata.
norc.org:41000/gss/DOCUMENTS/REPORTS/Methodological_Reports/MR0
03.pdf. In addition, household-size weights have the disadvantage that they
reduce the statistical efficiency of population parameter estimators such as
regression coefficients. Id. at 3. Efficient estimators are preferred because
they are likely to be closer to their population parameters than inefficient
estimators. RONALD J. WONNACOTT & THOMAS H. WONNACOTT,
ECONOMETRICS 58–60 (2d ed. 1979).
146
The need for the adjustment, and the use of √1.42 for the adjustment,
are explained in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological
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coefficients, the adjusted standard errors for the coefficients, and
the two-tailed levels of statistical significance for the coefficients
based on the adjusted standard errors. The tables also show the
constant in the regression equation and label it α.
Regression coefficients were initially estimated using data on
164 respondents.147 With a significance level of .10 as the
criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis,148 three independent
variables—educational attainment, sex, and frequency of
prayer—were related to the dependent variable. The
relationships can be more easily understood by converting each
regression coefficient into the percentage change in the odds that
a respondent will be coded 1 on MORALITY when the
independent variable in question rises by a measurement
category. Considered in these terms, the odds that morality
would be deemed a private matter were 70% lower for
respondents with thirteen or more years of schooling than for
respondents with twelve or fewer years schooling, were 246%
higher for females than for males, and rose by 87% for each

Framework, supra note 22, at 33–34.
147
A score (0 or 1) on MORALITY was available for 305 respondents. See
the text following supra note 128. However, the regression results were
based on no more than 164 of these respondents because data on one or more
of the independent variables did not exist for 141 respondents. Two factors
were primarily responsible for the inability to use the 141 respondents in the
regression analysis. First, the 1991 GSS gathered data on certain variables
only from subsamples of the full sample; of the independent variables in the
instant study, TRUST was not measured in one of the three subsamples in the
1991 GSS. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 2561, 2571.
Because the full sample was not asked the question for TRUST, there were
interviewees with data on MORALITY but not on TRUST. Second, some
interviewees who had a score of 0 or 1 on the dependent variable and who
were asked all of the questions measuring the independent variables either did
not answer a question for one (or more) of the independent variables or
responded to a question on an independent variable with an answer that was
outside the coding employed by the instant study (which coding is described
in Table 1).
148
As discussed in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological
Framework, supra note 22, at 35 n.84, caution is required when relying upon
tests of statistical significance.
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increase in category of prayer frequency.149
To determine whether the results obtained might be
misleading, a check was made for outliers, i.e., interviewees
whose coding on the dependent variable differed from the coding
that was predicted by the regression model. Outliers can
materially distort the coefficients estimated in a regression
analysis, and in order to identify influential outliers in the study,
Cook’s Statistic was calculated.150 Unfortunately, the process of
locating influential outliers is subjective,151 and thus I visually
examined the distribution of Cook’s Statistic.152 Doing so
revealed that Cook’s Statistic was far higher for two of the
interviewees than for any of the others.153 Accordingly, I omitted
these interviewees and re-estimated the regression model. In reestimating the coefficients, however, Stata dropped the variable
BORN, because the code of 1 on BORN perfectly predicted the
code of 0 on MORALITY and thereby prevented an estimation of
maximum likelihood.154
Given the problem with BORN, the regression analysis was
confined to the remaining independent variables. Tables 2 and 3
report the regression coefficients estimated for the independent
variables without BORN and without the two interviewees who
had the largest Cook’s Statistic. The coefficients in Tables 2 and
3 are thus based on data for 162 interviewees. In addition to
presenting the regression coefficients, the tables show the
adjusted standard error for each coefficient, the z score obtained
149

The odds ratios for these three variables were -0.298, 3.4647, and
1.873, respectively. Percentage changes were obtained from the regression
coefficients with the LISTCOEF command. LONG & FREESE, supra note 134, at
94–98, 464–67.
150
Id. at 128.
151
DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC
REGRESSION 175–76 (2d ed. 2000).
152
A visual examination of the distribution is suggested in LONG &
FREESE, supra note 134, at 151.
153
For these two interviewees, Cook’s Statistic was 0.99 and 2.16. For
the other interviewees, Cook’s Statistic was less than 0.60.
154
A maximum-likelihood regression coefficient cannot be estimated for
an independent variable that predicts the dependent variable without any
error. HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 151, at 138.
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with the adjusted standard error of the coefficient, and the twotailed statistical significance level for the z score.155
Table 2. Logit Coefficients and Significance Levels from
Regression of MORALITY on Independent Variables

Independent
variable
(mnemonic
label)

Regression
coefficient

Adjusted
standard
error

z

p>|z|

0.297
-1.151
-0.104
0.295
1.289
0.232

0.307
0.456
0.662
0.481
0.468
0.324

0.97
-2.52
-0.16
0.61
2.75
0.72

0.34
0.02
0.88
0.55
0.01
0.48

FATALISM
PRAYFREQ
TRUST

-0.744
0.677
0.385

0.777
0.286
0.456

-0.96
2.37
0.84

0.34
0.02
0.41

α

-2.441

1.322

-1.85

0.07

Structural
variables
AGE
EDUC
RACE
REALINC
SEX
XNORCSIZ

Cultural
variables

155

The null hypothesis was used to compute the z scores in Table 2 and
Table 3, i.e., every independent variable was assumed to be unrelated to the
dependent variable in the population from which the sample was drawn. Each
z score in the tables, accordingly, is the number of standard errors by which
the regression coefficient obtained from the sample deviated from a
regression coefficient of zero in the population that was sampled. EMILIO J.
CASTILLA, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 154–55 (2007).
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The regression model without BORN yielded results that were
similar to the regression model with BORN. The signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients that were statistically significant at
or below .10 did not differ materially between the two models.
Based on Table 2, the odds that morality would be regarded as a
private matter were 68% lower for respondents with thirteen or
more years of schooling than for respondents with twelve or
fewer years of schooling, were 263% higher for females than
for males, and rose by 97% with each increase in category of
prayer frequency.156 Because the impact of an independent
variable is estimated holding constant the impact of every other
independent variable in the regression model, the percentage
change in odds produced by a rise in category on an independent
variable is net of the percentage change in odds produced by a
rise in category on every other independent variable.
In considering the results reported in Table 2, a possibility
that must be explored is whether interaction existed between
independent variables. If the relationship of one independent
variable to the dependent variable differed across categories or
levels of another independent variable—i.e., if interaction was
present—the results in Table 2 do not accurately explain
MORALITY. The failure to uncover interaction thus would yield
incorrect conclusions regarding the manner in which independent
variables act on the dependent variable.
Theory rather than statistics should guide the selection of
independent variables to evaluate for potential interaction.157 In
light of this principle, it is notable that women in general have
been found by research to be more religious than men in
general, and a theory has been advanced that ascribes this
divergence in religiosity to sex-based differences in biology.158
156

The odds ratios were 0.316 for

EDUC,

3.631 for

SEX,

and 1.969 for

PRAYFREQ.
157

JAMES JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN
MULTIPLE REGRESSION 3–4 (2d ed. 2003); WILLIAM D. BERRY,
UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 30–31 (1993).
158
Rodney Stark, Physiology and Faith: Addressing the “Universal”
Gender Difference in Religious Commitment, 41 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 495,
495–500, 504 (2002).
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Consequently, I investigated the possibility that there was
interaction between SEX and PRAYFREQ by estimating the
regression coefficients for the independent variables (other than
SEX) separately for women (n = 95) and for men (n = 67). The
results are presented in Table 3, with the results for women in
the top panel of the table and the results for men in the bottom
panel.
Table 3. Logit Coefficients and Significance Levels by Sex
from Regression of MORALITY on Independent Variables

Independent
variable
(mnemonic
label) by sex

Regression
coefficient

Adjusted
standard
error

z

p>|z|

0.232
-1.318
0.000
0.247
0.341

0.424
0.592
0.856
0.576
0.418

0.55
-2.23
0.00
0.43
0.82

0.59
0.03
1.00
0.67
0.42

-1.724
0.475
0.377

1.382
0.398
0.571

-1.25
1.19
0.66

0.22
0.24
0.51

0.184

1.935

0.10

0.92

Women
Structural
variables
AGE
EDUC
RACE
REALINC
XNORCSIZ

Cultural
Variables
FATALISM
PRAYFREQ
TRUST

α
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Men
Structural
variables
0.306
-0.936
0.247
0.503
-0.001

0.480
0.798
1.135
0.979
0.571

0.64
-1.17
0.22
0.51
0.00

0.53
0.25
0.83
0.61
1.00

FATALISM
PRAYFREQ
TRUST

-0.261
0.908
0.418

1.277
0.454
0.805

-0.20
2.00
0.52

0.85
0.05
0.61

α

-3.276

2.318

-1.41

0.16

AGE
EDUC
RACE
REALINC
XNORCSIZ

Cultural
variables

Perhaps the most notable finding that emerges from Table 3
is the failure of even one explanatory variable to have regression
coefficients that were statistically significant both among women
and among men. Among women, only education had a
significant coefficient. When this coefficient is converted into an
odds ratio, the odds that morality would be considered private
are found to be 73% lower for women who had thirteen or more
years of schooling than for women who had twelve or fewer
years of schooling. Among men, frequency of prayer had the
sole significant coefficient; the conversion of this coefficient into
an odds ratio shows that the odds that morality would be deemed
159
private rise 148% for each category increase in PRAYFREQ.
However, the relationships uncovered by these coefficients have
no discernible logical connection to each other, and without an
identifiable pattern to the relationships, the coefficients in Table
159

The odds ratio for EDUC among women was 0.268; the odds ratio for
among men was 2.480.

PRAYFREQ
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among men stand on

C. Discussion
When the regression model employed in this study is
evaluated with the results in Tables 2 and 3, just one
independent variable is able to claim a general relationship to
whether adults in the United States regard morality as private or
as public.160 Net of the other independent variables in the model,
gender alone had an unconditional effect on social values
defining morality as private or public. The influence that gender
exercised, moreover, was far from trivial: the odds that morality
would be deemed private were fully three-and-a-half times
greater among women than among men.161
Tables 2 and 3, however, do not exhaust the insights that can
be gleaned from the data. A fuller understanding of the effect of
gender can be obtained from the accuracy with which
independent variables in the instant study predicted whether
interviewees would view morality as private or as public.
Accuracy was determined first by regressing MORALITY on just
SEX (Model 1) and then by regressing MORALITY on the three
independent variables—EDUC, SEX, and PRAYFREQ—whose
coefficients in Table 2 were found to be statistically significant
(Model 2). The regression analyses used the same 162
interviewees as Tables 2 and 3. The measure of accuracy is the
percentage of all predictions by a model that were correct. The
162
percentages are in Table 4.

160

The reader should keep in mind that the instant study utilizes crosssectional data and that, because change over time cannot be observed, such
data produce erroneous conclusions regarding causal relationships more often
than longitudinal data. Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological
Framework, supra note 22, at 33.
161
Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
162
The percentages were computed in Stata with the ESTAT
CLASSIFICATION command and its default probability cutoff, i.e., ≥ 0.5.
STATA REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 145, at 166–67.
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Table 4. Predictions by Independent Variables: Correct
Predictions as a Percentage of All Predictions

Correct predictions from
Model 1:
SEX

Model 2:
EDUC, SEX & PRAYFREQ

Morality private or
morality public

63.6%

72.2%

Morality private

59.0%

67.8%

Morality public

70.2%

77.3%

Prediction

I begin with Model 1. For predictions with SEX alone,
accuracy was 63.6% when considering both predictions of
interviewees who would classify morality as private and
predictions of interviewees who would classify morality as
public. However, the overall percentage masks a difference:
Model 1 was noticeably less successful in predicting
interviewees who would view morality as a private matter (59%)
than in predicting interviewees who would view morality as a
public matter (70.2%).
I turn now to Model 2, which retains gender as an
independent variable but adds educational attainment and prayer
frequency. As Table 4 shows, the use of the three independent
variables together greatly improved success in predicting the
interviewees who would regard morality as private and the
interviewees who would regard morality as public. Specifically,
the three independent variables jointly increased the accuracy of
predictions by not less than seven percentage points. Although
educational attainment influences the designation of morality as
private or public only among women and prayer frequency
influences the designation only among men (see Table 3), the
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two variables enhance the ability of gender to identify persons in
terms of their social values on the private or public nature of
morality.
IV. CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND THE CONTENT OF
LAW
Perhaps it should not be surprising that women and men
differ materially in their social values on whether morality is a
private matter or a public issue. After all, much if not most of
social life is affected to some extent by the attribute of biological
sex and by the different roles in society that are attached to this
attribute.163 In the discussion that follows, however, I focus not
on the sociology of gender but on the importance for law of the
findings in Tables 2, 3, and 4 that pertain to gender. The
findings, I suggest, may help to explain the change in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution by the U.S.
Supreme Court with respect to set of related issues that were
presented in cases spanning almost forty years.164 Unfortunately,
the paradigm that currently dominates the legal profession is
unlikely to recognize the contribution to the change that may
have been made by the gender difference in social values on
morality. That paradigm, by embodying the concept of “the rule
of law,” assumes the primacy of law. In doing so, the paradigm
ignores the subservience of law to conditions in the social
system.
The law to which the findings are relevant involves
sexuality. Currently, the U.S. Constitution is construed to bar
government penalties for nonpublic, noncommercial sexual
163

Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Gender Inequality in Law:
Problems of Structure and Agency in Recent Studies of Gender in AngloAmerican Legal Professions, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 681, 697 (1998).
164
My reasoning assumes that the relationships reported in Tables 2 and
3 are not confined to 1991, the year in which the data for these tables were
obtained. The assumption is plausible at least with regard to gender. As
reported supra in note 156 and accompanying text, gender had a very large
impact on whether morality is deemed to be a public issue or a private
matter. An impact of this magnitude is unlikely to occur in just a single year.
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activity—homosexual as well as heterosexual—between adults
who consent to the activity and who are capable of giving
consent.165 The prohibition on penalties for such activity is based
largely on a right of privacy that the U.S. Supreme Court
believes emanates from the liberty guarantee that is explicit in
the two due process clauses of the Constitution.166 Indeed, the
line of cases through which the Court announced that the
Constitution protects sexual activity between adults that is
consensual, nonpublic, and noncommercial began with a case
decided in 1965 in which the Court explicitly employed the
concept of a right of privacy.167 Notably, the Court has
expressed a concern with privacy even when, in invalidating
government penalties for sexual activity and closely related
matters, it seems to have relied on other grounds—for instance
the liberty guarantee alone168 or the equal protection guarantee.169
165

Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The
State Marriage Amendments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 271
(2005).
166
Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, Warts and All: Four Score of Liberty,
Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004). The Fifth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment contain similarly worded liberty guarantees.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”). While the liberty guarantee in the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to the federal government, the liberty guarantee in
the Fourteenth Amendment covers state government. Heiner v. Donnan, 285
U.S. 312, 326 (1932).
167
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). In Griswold,
the Supreme Court inferred a right of privacy from a number of constitutional
provisions. Id. at 485. In 1973, the Court attached the right of privacy to the
liberty guarantee of due process, at least insofar as the right pertains to
marriage, family, and sexuality. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
168
Government penalties for nonpublic, noncommercial, consensual
same-sex sexual activity were held unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Although the Court repeatedly refers to the liberty
guarantee in the Constitution, it concludes that the state statute at issue
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.” Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
The Court thus explicitly focused on privacy, suggesting that the
constitutional right at issue is a right directed at protecting privacy. Id.
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By accepting privacy as an important concern, the Court implied
that the right at issue was a right to privacy even though its
holding was not explicitly based on privacy.
The preceding change in law, I believe, is explained partially
by the findings reported in Part III of this Article. In order to
develop the explanation, I turn to a quantitative indicator of the
social status of men relative to the social status of women in the
United States. The indicator, which is portrayed graphically in
Figure 1, is the difference between the percentage of men and
the percentage of women who, at age twenty-five to twentynine, possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree in each decennial
census year from 1940 to 2000.170 Because the data are for seven
equally spaced time points covering a total of sixty years, Figure
1 supplies a census-based measure of social status differences
grounded on gender during most of the twentieth century.

Furthermore, the Court in Lawrence approved a passage in an opinion it had
previously authored that described sexually relevant activities as entailing
“the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.”
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)) (emphasis added). In crafting its opinion in Lawrence, the Court
also adopted a passage from a dissenting opinion written for an earlier case;
the passage stated that the “intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons” were beyond the constitutional powers of government to regulate.
Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stephens, J.. dissenting)) (emphasis added). The word “intimate” connotes
privacy. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 945
(3d ed. 1992) (defining “intimate” as an adjective to include “[m]arked by
informality and privacy” and “[v]ery personal; private”).
169
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws . . . .”). In ruling that a state statute violated the equal
protection guarantee by restricting to married persons the distribution of items
to be used for preventing pregnancy, the Court emphasized the relevance of a
constitutional right of privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972).
170
The data for Figure 1 are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A HALFCENTURY OF LEARNING: HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940 TO 2000 tbl.2 (2006), http://www.
census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/phct41.html.
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Figure 1. Sex Gap at Age 25-29 in Percentage with Bachelor's or Higher Degree
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To appreciate fully the importance of the data in the figure,
it is necessary to realize that the male-female difference in
educational attainment in the United States for most of the
century-and-a-half after the Civil War was mainly at the college
level.171 The difference between men and women in college
completion, therefore, is a useful barometer of the relative status
of each sex at a single point in time and of change in the relative
status of each sex over time.172 The indicator does not capture
171

ANDREA ADAMS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE
UNITED STATES: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (2008), http://www.
census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/educattn.html; JAMES P. SMITH &
MICHAEL P. WARD, WOMEN’S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 39 tbl.20 (1984), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/
2007/R3119.pdf. In addition, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
172
Figure 1 provides just a measure of the magnitude of a status
differential between men and women in a given year. The figure thus
assumes that, at each point in time, a male-female difference in social status
is correlated with the male-female difference in rates of college completion.
Figure 1 makes no assumption as to whether or how the two variables (social
status and college completion) are causally connected.
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every dimension of sex roles and status, of course. However,
the indicator is useful because it measures an attribute of
individuals early in their lives, and the attribute has the potential
to affect markedly later stages of the life cycle, especially in
terms of occupation and income from employment.
Unfortunately, the figure cannot be extended further back in
time—i.e., cannot cover years prior to 1940—because the census
did not gather information on educational attainment until
1940.173
The shift in law on sexuality and related matters that the
United States experienced from the mid-1960s onward is likely
to be attributable partially to the shift in the status of women
174
that Figure 1 reveals. Understanding this link will be aided by
a brief explanation of the figure. In particular, Figure 1 was
constructed from the difference between the percentage of men
twenty-five to twenty-nine years old and the percentage of
women twenty-five to twenty-nine years old who, in the census
year specified, possessed a Bachelor’s degree or a higher
degree. Because the percentage for women was subtracted from
the percentage for men, a number above zero means that
proportionally more men than women held a degree; conversely,
a number below zero means that proportionally more women
than men held a degree. The horizontal line across Figure 1
serves as a reference and marks the point at which the
percentage for men is equal to the percentage for women. When
the trend line—the line connecting the male-female difference in
degrees in each census year—is moving away from the
173

ADAMS, supra note 171. Data from the census of 1940 have been
employed in conjunction with other data to estimate years of schooling
completed and degrees received by five-year cohorts born in 1866–1870 and
later. SMITH & WARD, supra note 171, at 35 nn.6 & 7. However, the
estimates are for educational attainment of each birth cohort during the
lifetime of the cohort, not at a specific age.
174
The data described in supra note 173 have been used to show that the
sex gap in college-level education generally predicts U.S. Supreme Court
decisions during most of the twentieth century on whether the national
Constitution is violated by government policies that distinguish males and
females. LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT 50–55
(1993).
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horizontal line, the gender gap in college completion is
expanding, and when the trend line is moving toward the
horizontal line, the gender gap is contracting.
Figure 1 shows that the male advantage in Bachelor’s and
graduate degrees at age twenty-five to twenty-nine rose
substantially from 1940 to 1960, fell slightly from 1960 to 1970,
and then began a steep descent. Indeed, the decline after 1970
was so large in magnitude and rapid in speed that by 1990 a
slightly larger percentage of women than of men in the twentyfive to twenty-nine age group held a Bachelor’s or higher
degree.175 In the history of a nation, alterations in social structure
of this size and swiftness are probably infrequent.
The change in the gender gap that is portrayed in Figure 1 is
likely to have contributed to the change that took place after the
middle of the twentieth century in law on sexuality and its
incidents. In evaluating the plausibility of such a link, an
important point to keep in mind is that the gender gap in Figure
1 is measured by college completion among individuals who
were twenty-five to twenty-nine years old. The age range that
was used for the measure (i.e., age twenty-five through age
twenty-nine) is important for two reasons. First, since most firstyear college students in the last half of the twentieth century
evidently matriculated in college shortly before or after their
eighteenth birthday,176 the pursuit of a Bachelor’s degree by
175

It is probably not coincidence that, after removing the effects of the
different choices that men and women in the United States make due to sex
roles, there was only a small gender gap in compensation from employment
in 2000. June O’Neill, The Gender Gap in Wages, Circa 2000, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 309, 313 tbl.3 (May 2003) (models 2 and 3). Because current
compensation evidently involves a lengthier process than educational
attainment, a gender-linked compensation differential can be expected to
respond more slowly than a gender-linked education differential to the
societal forces that alter the status of women vis-à-vis men.
176
For example, at the time of the 1970 census (which occurred on or
around April 1, 1970), 83.6% of all first-year college students (male and
female) who were younger than twenty-five had been seventeen, eighteen or
nineteen years old when the 1969–70 academic year started (or, more
precisely, on October 1, 1969). Calculated from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1970
CENSUS OF POPULATION. Vol. II. Series PC(2). 5A SUBJECT REPORTS:
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persons who hold such a degree at age twenty-five to twentynine started normally when these persons were much younger—
specifically, an average of about nine or ten years younger.
Thus, the societal changes that affected educational attainment at
age twenty-five to twenty-nine, but did so differently among
women than among men, happened (or at least began)
approximately a decade before women and men were in this age
range. Second, the societal conditions that determine the college
matriculation rates of women and of men probably do not have
an instantaneous effect. Rather, the conditions are likely to
operate with a time lag, and although the number of years that
must pass for the effect to materialize is unknown, a half-decade
could be required. When the two preceding points are combined,
the small contraction of the sex gap between 1960 and 1970, and
the large contraction that started in 1970, must be understood as
responses to societal changes that took place or that had their
inception more than a decade earlier. Consequently, the societal
foundation for the higher status of men relative to women was
evidently beginning to erode by 1950, and in the 1960s and
later, the pace of the erosion markedly increased.
What societal consequences flowed from the changes that
occurred in the gender-based status differential during the last
half of the twentieth century? The answer may be the following.
Because the odds that morality will be treated as a private matter
are much higher among women than among men, the changes in
the societal foundation for the status of women vis-a-vis men
during the 1950s and 1960s—the changes that altered the course
of the trend line in Figure 1—probably enhanced the prominence
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 119 tbl.5 (1970), available at http://www2.census.
gov/prod2/decennial/documents/42045400v2p5a5cch01.pdf. In late 1969,
consequently, five out of six first-year college students who had not reached
age twenty-five were a maximum of one year away from age 18. The
proportion of these students who earned a Bachelor’s degree is unknown.
However, among women who are enrolled in college when they are younger
than twenty, relatively few seem not to complete a Bachelor’s degree before
their thirtieth birthday. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Rosalind Berkowitz King, Age
and College Completion: A Life-History Analysis of Women Aged 15–44, 75
SOCIOL. EDUC. 211, 219 fig.1 (2002) (cumulative completion rates estimated
from figure 1).
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and influence of the view that issues of morality are not
appropriately handled in a public setting or by a public body. As
the status of women rose, in other words, the values of women
were increasingly a factor in social life and were incorporated
into law. Sexuality and related matters, therefore, gradually
came to be regarded as beyond the scope of government
regulation. In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
government prohibitions on the use by married couples of items
to prevent pregnancy were inconsistent with a constitutionally
based right of privacy.177 This ruling may not have represented a
major jurisprudential step because the law had traditionally
considered the relationship between spouses to be private.178
Subsequently, however, the view that sexual activity and its
incidents are private rather than public matters was extended to
other government restrictions on adults. Thus, complete or
almost-complete bans on aborting pregnancies were held
unconstitutional not only when directed at an adult female who
is unmarried179 but also when directed at an adult female who is
180
Most
married and cannot secure the consent of her husband.
recently, the view that sexuality is a private concern was
responsible for the invalidation on constitutional grounds of
government prohibitions on same-sex sexual activity between
177

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1979) (describing the
purpose and historical roots of the privilege against adverse testimony by a
person against her/his spouse). During the last half of the twentieth century,
the privilege that allows a married person to bar testimony against the person
by his or her spouse when the testimony involves confidential marital matters
became less prevalent, and the conditions under which the privilege could be
exercised were narrowed. Id. at 48–50. These changes are consistent with
the evident intensification of individualism that has occurred in the United
States since the middle of the century and with the equalization of the status
of men and of women that accompanied or resulted from greater
individualism. Individualism and gender equality are probably the result of
the long-term growth of knowledge. Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at 336–
37; The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 628–32, 678–79.
179
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 165 n.67 (1973).
180
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70–71
(1976).
178
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adults that is consensual, nonpublic, and noncommercial.181
If the higher social status of women had an impact on law
governing sexuality, how large was the impact? Unfortunately,
an answer to the question is not possible at the present time,
because the answer needs to deal with the net impact of the
change in women’s social status. The findings in Tables 2, 3,
and 4—together with the data in Figure 1—suggest that there
were two effects on social values bearing on whether morality is
public or private and that to some degree these effects offset one
another. According to the findings in Tables 2 and 3, social
values that classify morality as private are affected by gender,
and they are affected even more when educational attainment
and prayer frequency are added to gender as causal agents.
However, while the odds that morality will be considered a
private issue are appreciably higher among women than men,
the regression coefficient for educational attainment among
women is negative in Table 3. Accordingly, social values that
assign morality to the private sphere become less widespread as
women acquire more schooling.
In short, the enhanced status of women in society, as
represented by sex differences in rates of college completion,
poses a problem for understanding whether and how the law was
influenced by social values on whether morality is a private
matter or a public issue. If the reasoning I have proposed is
correct, the changing societal conditions that improved the status
of women relative to the status of men magnified the effect of
sex per se, thus expanding the prevalence and influence of social
values that deem morality to be a private matter and an
unacceptable subject for regulation through law. On the other
hand, the societal forces that were responsible for the higher
status of women resulted in more years of college-level
182
schooling for a larger proportion of women. The increases in
181

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In addition, see supra note

168.
182

SMITH & WARD, supra note 171, at 36 tbl.18 (rates of college
attendance and completion among women by birth cohort); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 170 (percentage of women twenty-five to twenty-nine
years old who had received at least a Bachelor’s degree by census year from
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educational attainment among women, in turn, reduced the
extent to which the social values of women designated morality
as private and, presumably, the influence of these values in
society.
Was the change in social values that was brought about by
gender on its own neutralized by the change in social values that
was brought about by gains in college attendance and completion
among women? The question is important because the answer
has the potential to advance our understanding of the processes
involved in the shift in law on sexuality that the United States
underwent starting in the mid-1960s. Regrettably, an answer is
not possible with the evidence that is currently available,183 and
additional research is required. However, it is unlikely to be a
coincidence that the odds of classifying morality as private are
much higher among women than among men and that the status
of women was rising relative to the status of men during the
same period in history in which law was liberalizing on sexual
activity and its incidents. Like every society, the United States is
a social system, and in a system, concurrent phenomena are
presumptively interconnected, not independent. Therefore, the
1940 to 2000); see also U.S. Census Bureau, Table A-2: Percentage of the
Population 3 Years Old and Over Enrolled in School, by Age, Sex, Race,
and Hispanic Origin: October 1947 to 2008, http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/school/TableA-2.xls (last visited Feb. 15, 2010)
(percentages of women at age 18–19, age 20–21, age 22–24, and age 25–59
who were enrolled in school between 1947 and 2008).
183
Standardized regression coefficients allow two (or more) explanatory
variables to be compared for their relative impact on the dependent variable.
In the instant study, the standardized regression coefficients based on the
standard deviations of the explanatory variables (rather than on the standard
deviation of the dependent variable) may indicate that the effect of gender
outweighed the effect of increased college-level education among women.
Specifically, for the results in Table 2, the coefficients standardized on the
standard deviation of their respective independent variables were -0.577 for
EDUC and 0.637 for SEX. The standardized coefficient for SEX was thus
somewhat larger than the standardized coefficient for EDUC. However, the
utility of standardized coefficients in logistic regression remains to be
established, especially when the dependent variable is measured as a dummy.
PAMPEL, supra note 141, at 32. In the instant study, the dependent variable
(i.e., MORALITY) was a dummy. See supra tbl. 1 in the text of this article.
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proposition is at least plausible, and indeed seems probable, that
the influence in society of social values treating morality as
private was affected appreciably more by the sex attribute and
associated social roles than by the extent to which women
achieved a college-level education.
V. CONCLUSION
The biological attribute of sex has been and remains a
cornerstone of social structure in the United States,184 and to the
extent the societal significance of the attribute results from malefemale differences in hormones that cause male-female
differences in behavior,185 sex-based distinctions will not be
eliminated from social life even if they are prohibited by law.
Notably, during the last half of the twentieth century, U.S. law
incorporated a doctrine of female-male equality and disapproved
various socially significant sex-based distinctions. When
interpreting the Constitution, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court discarded traditional beliefs regarding the place of women
in society and endorsed the view that women are entitled to go
beyond the roles of wife and mother.186 The same view appeared
187
in federal statutes.
A description of a shift in law, of course, is only a first step;
an explanation of the shift and its timing is also needed. In my
macrosociological framework, the shift in law on the sex
attribute is presumed to have resulted from substantial change in
the degree to which and/or the manner in which the attribute
184

Kathy A. Thomack, Centering Men’s Experience: Norah Vincent’s
Self-Made Man Complicates Feminist Legal Theorists’ Views of Gender, 15
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 30 (2006) (contending that the sex attribute is the
most influential of societally defined characteristics in shaping social behavior
and self-conception).
185
J. Richard Udry, Biological Limits of Gender Construction, 65 AM.
SOCIOL. REV. 443 (2000).
186
Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and
Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 220–60 (2003).
187
The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 632–34 (federal statutes
prohibiting sex-based discrimination in employment).
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was organizing society. While all of the aspects of the changed
sex basis of social structure are probably still unknown, Figure 1
reveals that the status of women increased relative to the status
of men after 1960. However, the shift in U.S. law was not
confined to female-male distinctions per se; as discussed in Part
IV, the shift extended to sexuality.188 Unless the breadth of the
shift is assumed to be happenstance—which would not accord
with the tenet of science that the world is orderly—it can be
explained. The results of the data analysis in Part III suggest that
at least a partial explanation is a sex difference in social values
regarding morality as a private or public matter. If so, these
values are a link in a chain of causation between women’s
relative status in society and law bearing on the sex attribute and
sexuality.
The macrosociological framework I have proposed, however,
is not limited to a single topic or to a single set of related topics.
On the contrary, the framework contends that, in a democratic
nation, all of the fundamental concepts and doctrines of law are
attributable to their societal context. The framework thus denies
that law is self-contained and self-determined, that law has
primacy over other elements of the social system, and that law is
permanently shaped by individual personalities. Instead, the
framework maintains that the important concepts and doctrines
of law found in a democracy (i) are generated by the properties
of society (e.g., average educational attainment) and (ii) undergo
change as the properties of society are altered by large-scale
forces (e.g., the growth of knowledge). The framework also
maintains that the impact of the macro-level forces on societal
properties typically occurs slowly (and perhaps at an uneven
pace) and that the societal properties affected by these forces
normally produce new law when (and because) thresholds are
reached.
Although a macrosociological framework does not accord
with any paradigm that is widely accepted at the present time in
scholarship on law, such a framework merits investigation. The
framework not only is consistent with a considerable body of
188

Supra notes 165–69, 177–81.
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empirical evidence, but it can benefit social life by promoting
research on the societal causes of law. In particular, research on
the jurisdiction-level causes of law can be expected to lead to
predictions of new law. If the proposed framework has utility,
such predictions can be made well in advance of the emergence
of the law being predicted, because alterations in jurisdictionlevel properties usually occur over many years before generating
law. Although the predictions will not always be accurate, they
are likely to be correct much more often than they are incorrect.
If so, quantitative studies of the jurisdiction-level conditions that
shape law will allow a democratic nation to (i) prepare for new
law and (ii) appreciate that important doctrines in its law do not
depend in the long run on individuals, no matter how influential
the individuals seem to be. Insofar as (ii) is prevalent, there will
be less socially harmful conflict in a democracy over law that
deviates from traditional cultural values. Especially if it involves
violence and threats of violence, conflict can undermine the
social order, as illustrated in the United States with regard to
law on abortion and the provision of, and access to, abortion
services.189 Because law on important aspects of social life at a
given point in history expresses the character of society rather
than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, however, conflict directed
at such law will not—indeed, cannot—have an enduring effect,
and efforts to eliminate the law will have no more than
temporary success. To the extent the foregoing is acknowledged,
conflict over law that breaches social convention will be
understood as futile. The probable result will be that such
conflict will not occur as frequently, and when it occurs, it will
not be as protracted.

189

S. REP. NO. 103–17 (1993), available at 1993 WL 286699. From the
late 1970s to the early 1990s, “[a] nationwide campaign of anti-abortion
blockades, invasions, vandalism and outright violence” in the United States
was found to be “endangering the lives and well-being of the health care
providers who work there and the patients who seek their services.” Id. at 3.

